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In the US constitutional system, the president generally conducts foreign rela-
tions. But not always. In recent years, the courts and Congress have repeatedly taken 
steps to interact directly with foreign governments. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign 
relations occurs when the courts or Congress engage in or take actions that result in 
the opening of a direct channel of official communications between the US non-
executive branch and a foreign executive branch. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign 
relations raises serious constitutional questions, but to date there is no clear rubric 
for analyzing the constitutionality of the judiciary’s or Congress’s actions. Moreover, 
nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is likely to become more frequent due to 
changes in technology, foreign governments’ increasing sophistication about the US 
government, hyperpartisanship in the United States, and what might be called the 
“Trump effect.” 
Building on Justice Robert Jackson’s iconic tripartite framework from 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, this Article proposes a converse 
Youngstown framework for determining when nonexecutive conduct of foreign rela-
tions is constitutional. The converse Youngstown framework judges the 
constitutionality of the courts’ or Congress’s actions in light of executive authorization 
or condonation (Category 1), executive silence (Category 2), or executive opposition 
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(Category 3). The converse Youngstown framework offers significant advantages 
over the current ad hoc approach to analyzing nonexecutive conduct of foreign rela-
tions, and it avoids some of the pitfalls that critics have identified with traditional 
Youngstown analysis. First, it more accurately reflects the fact that the president 
isn’t the only actor who exercises foreign relations initiative. Second, it avoids much 
of the indeterminacy that plagues traditional Youngstown analysis. Finally, it sim-
plifies the constitutional analysis of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by ex-
plaining why easy cases are easy, allowing courts to engage in constitutional avoid-
ance in some cases, and showing how Congress and the courts may sometimes trump 
the executive, even in Category 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the US constitutional system, the executive branch gener-
ally conducts foreign relations.1 But in recent years, the 
 
 1 See, for example, American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 414 
(2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the 
Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of 
our foreign relations.’”), quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610–
11 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring); First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
406 US 759, 767–68 (1972) (noting that the Court “has recognized the primacy of the 
Executive in the conduct of foreign relations” and that the executive branch is “charged 
. . . with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs”). See also Curtis A. 
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 145–46 
(Aspen 6th ed 2017) (“Congress has an elaborate institutional machinery devoted to for-
eign relations[, but] despite its broad powers and institutional expertise, Congress gener-
ally does not conduct U.S. foreign relations.”); id at 155 (“[T]he President is often described 
as having the dominant role in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.”); Louis Henkin, 
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 42 (Clarendon 2d ed 1996) (“That the 
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nonexecutive branches—the judiciary and Congress—have chal-
lenged the exclusivity of the president’s authority to conduct for-
eign relations by opening direct channels of communication with 
foreign governments’ executive branches. For example, in 
January 2015, Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress, 
breaking protocol by failing to coordinate with the White House.2 
Two months later, forty-seven Republican senators, led by 
Senator Tom Cotton, penned a letter to the leaders of Iran in an 
attempt to undermine the executive branch’s negotiations to halt 
Iran’s nuclear program.3 More recently, Senator John McCain in-
dependently reached out to the Australian ambassador to smooth 
over relations after President Donald Trump “abruptly ended” a 
call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.4 
These contacts challenge conventional understandings about 
the constitutional separation of powers. Although the judiciary 
decides cases related to foreign affairs,5 and Congress exercises 
fiscal, treaty, and other powers that affect foreign relations,6 gen-
erally the executive branch actually conducts foreign relations, 
interacting directly with representatives of foreign governments’ 
 
President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not 
been questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”). 
 2 See notes 93–111 and accompanying text. 
 3 See notes 127–37 and accompanying text. 
 4 Greg Miller and Philip Rucker, ‘This Was the Worst Call by Far’: Trump Badgered, 
Bragged and Abruptly Ended Phone Call with Australian Leader (Wash Post, Feb 2, 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9XTY-F9NP. See also Statement by SASC Chairman John 
McCain on U.S.-Australia Alliance (John McCain, Feb 2, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M6VF-Z9DJ (reporting on McCain’s phone call with Ambassador Joe 
Hockey). 
 5 See, for example, RJR Nabisco, Inc v European Community, 136 S Ct 2090, 2099–
2106 (2016) (addressing the extraterritorial reach of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act); Samantar v Yousef, 560 US 305, 325 (2010) (holding that the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act does not govern a defendant’s claim to foreign official im-
munity); Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491, 504–06 (2008) (discussing the doctrine of 
treaty self-execution). 
 6 See US Const Art I, § 8 (giving Congress the powers, inter alia, to “regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations” and to “declare War”); US Const Art II, § 2 (qualifying the 
president’s treaty power by requiring “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” in the pro-
cess). See also, for example, American Insurance Association, 539 US at 414 (recognizing 
that the president has independent foreign affairs powers, but that “Congress holds ex-
press authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and 
foreign commerce powers”); Bradley and Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law at 146 (cited 
in note 1) (noting that “Congress [ ] exercises significant influence on U.S. foreign policy” 
because of its “power of the purse” and other institutional powers); id at 136 (“Article I of 
the Constitution confers on Congress numerous powers relating to the conduct of foreign 
relations.”) (emphasis added). 
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executive branches.7 The Netanyahu invitation and other 
examples deviate from this model. Moreover, courts, Congress, 
executive officials, and commentators lack a framework—much 
less an agreed-upon framework—for assessing whether the 
actions nonetheless comply with the Constitution. 
Actors within and outside the three branches of government 
often analyze separation-of-powers disputes using the tripartite 
framework set out in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer.8 Jackson’s Youngstown 
framework assumes, however, that the action in question is an 
executive action that must be judged in light of Congress’s ap-
proval, silence, or disapproval. The Netanyahu invitation and 
other examples disrupt this assumption: their defining feature is 
the initiative exercised by the nonexecutive branch in engaging 
in direct contacts with foreign governments. 
Building on the Netanyahu invitation, the Cotton letter, and 
additional historical and recent examples, this Article identifies 
“nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations” as a discrete category 
of constitutional questions and then proposes a “converse 
Youngstown” framework for resolving separation-of-powers dis-
putes when the branch whose actions are at issue is Congress or 
the judiciary. 
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations occurs when a non-
executive branch—the courts or Congress—engages in or takes 
actions that result in the opening of a direct channel of official 
communications between the US nonexecutive branch and a for-
eign executive branch. Although the courts and Congress often 
take actions that affect foreign policy, the direct conduct of rela-
tions with foreign governments has long been understood as the 
province of the executive.9 It is precisely the incongruity of 
conduct that would be considered diplomacy if done by executive 
 
 7 See note 1 (collecting sources). 
 8 343 US 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson concurring). 
 9 See Bradley and Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law at 172 (cited in note 1) (“In 
practice, the Executive Branch exercises a virtual monopoly over formal communications 
with foreign nations.”); Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 88 (cited in note 1) (“Since the early 
years [ ], Congress has not seriously doubted that the President is the sole organ of com-
munication with foreign governments: Congress does not speak or receive communications 
on behalf of the United States, or negotiate with foreign governments, or ‘conduct foreign 
relations.’”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over 
International Law, 131 Harv L Rev 1201, 1258 (2018) (noting that the president is “un-
derstood to be the official organ of the United States in diplomacy”). See also note 1 (col-
lecting sources). 
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officials being undertaken by nonexecutive officials that renders 
the actions constitutionally suspect.10 
The need to determine the constitutionality or unconstitu-
tionality of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations (or “non-
executive foreign relations,” for short) is rendered more urgent 
because several factors suggest that the phenomenon is likely to 
become more frequent going forward. Most basically, technology 
has made international communications easier, and, as other 
scholars have noted,11 technology facilitates the formation of hor-
izontal transnational government networks between US govern-
ment entities and their foreign counterparts. It does the same for 
the diagonal transnational networks—that is, Congress to foreign 
executives and the judiciary to foreign executives—at issue in 
nonexecutive foreign relations. Foreign governments have also 
become more sophisticated about disaggregating the US govern-
ment. Increased familiarity with the US policy process allows for-
eign governments to forum shop, reaching out to potentially sym-
pathetic audiences in US government entities other than their 
traditional State Department interlocutors. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the hyperpartisanship that dominates US political dis-
course, especially when combined with the Trump administra-
tion’s perceived incompetence at and inattention to diplomacy, 
will incentivize US officials outside the executive branch to reach 
out to foreign governments. It may also incentivize foreign offi-
cials to seek interlocutors outside the executive branch in order 
to hedge their bets by engaging broadly with actors across the US 
political spectrum. 
By definition, all incidents of nonexecutive foreign relations 
involve the same powers on the part of the executive—namely, 
the powers to appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent 
of the Senate and to receive ambassadors. Nonexecutive foreign 
relations incidents vary, however, in which powers (if any) of the 
nonexecutive branch they involve. This variance allows for the 
 
 10 I do not use the term “diplomacy” to describe nonexecutive conduct of foreign rela-
tions because to do so carries normative implications. Calling judicial or legislative inter-
actions with foreign executives “diplomacy” may have a legitimating effect that suggests 
the actions are necessarily constitutional. Or, on the other hand, it could suggest that the 
judicial and legislative actors are acting unconstitutionally by taking on executive-branch 
roles as diplomats. To avoid either implication, I have chosen the neutral term “non-
executive conduct of foreign relations” (“nonexecutive foreign relations,” for short), saving 
the constitutional assessment for Part III. But see Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative 
Diplomacy, 112 Mich L Rev 331, 334 (2013) (defining the term “legislative diplomacy” as 
“diplomacy by Congress or one of its members”). 
 11 See note 156 and accompanying text. 
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creation of a typology of nonexecutive foreign relations incidents 
based on whether the nonexecutive branch is receiving communi-
cations from a foreign government (“inbound nonexecutive for-
eign relations”) or is purporting to convey information to a foreign 
government (“outbound nonexecutive foreign relations”). The dif-
ference between inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign re-
lations affects the constitutional analysis. 
This Article’s proposed converse Youngstown framework pro-
vides an analytically rigorous method for executive-branch offi-
cials, legislators, judges, and scholars to determine when non-
executive foreign relations are and are not constitutionally 
permissible.12 The converse Youngstown framework ensures that 
the actions of the legislature or the judiciary are judged not only 
by reference to the textual constitutional allocation of power, but 
in light of executive authorization or condonation (Category 1), 
executive silence (Category 2), or executive opposition (Cate-
gory 3). As in traditional Youngstown analysis, the converse 
Youngstown framework reveals how the relationship between 
branches of the federal government can affect the constitutional-
ity of each branch’s actions. 
The converse Youngstown framework offers significant bene-
fits over the current ad hoc approach to analyzing nonexecutive 
conduct of foreign relations, and it also avoids some of the pitfalls 
that critics have identified with traditional Youngstown analysis. 
First, while the traditional Youngstown framework is de-
signed to evaluate instances when the president exercises initia-
tive, the converse Youngstown framework accounts for the fact 
that sometimes Congress and the judiciary prevail in a race to 
act. Converse Youngstown may actually incentivize greater initi-
ative taking by the nonexecutive branches by mandating careful 
consideration of their constitutional positions. Such initiative 
taking may have the salutary effect of defending Congress and 
the judiciary against executive claims that they have acquiesced 
to executive assertions of power. 
Second, the converse Youngstown framework is less suscep-
tible to the indeterminacy that critics argue plagues the tradi-
tional Youngstown framework. In particular, Professor Laurence 
Tribe has recently assailed Youngstown for being indeterminate 
with respect to Category 2 cases—when the president acts in the 
 
 12 This Article focuses on nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations, but the converse 
Youngstown framework can be applied to other constitutional disputes as well. See notes 
282–84 and accompanying text (discussing other scenarios). 
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face of congressional silence. Converse Youngstown avoids this 
concern to a large extent because, due to structural differences 
between the branches, the president is less likely than Congress 
to remain silent, suggesting that there will be fewer Category 2 
cases in converse Youngstown. Moreover, converse Youngstown 
makes clearer the import of Category 2 cases that do occur. The 
comparative ease with which the president can respond to actions 
by the nonexecutive branches suggests that silence by the execu-
tive is a more meaningful signal of approval or acquiescence 
than silence by Congress, which faces structural impediments to 
action. 
Finally, the converse Youngstown framework simplifies the 
analysis of the constitutionality of nonexecutive foreign relations. 
The current ad hoc approach to assessing the constitutionality of 
particular nonexecutive foreign relations incidents does not ac-
count for the importance of the executive’s approval, acquies-
cence, or opposition. 
The converse Youngstown framework explains why easy 
cases are easy. In Category 1 cases, the converse Youngstown 
framework changes the question from whether the nonexecutive 
branch has independent authority for its action to whether the 
nonexecutive branch’s power (if any) plus the power of the execu-
tive is constitutionally sufficient. Because the executive’s power 
alone is likely to be sufficient in many instances, converse 
Youngstown makes nonexecutive foreign relations incidents, done 
with the approval of the president, easy questions. It also allows 
adjudicators to engage in constitutional avoidance, obviating the 
need to determine the precise scope of the nonexecutive branch’s 
constitutional power in cases in which the executive’s power alone 
is sufficient. 
In addition, the converse Youngstown framework improves 
upon ad hoc analysis for hard cases—those in Category 3, when 
the president disapproves of the actions of the nonexecutive 
branch. Using the converse Youngstown framework to assess Cat-
egory 3 examples from Part II shows that the president should 
often prevail when the nonexecutive branch engages in outbound 
nonexecutive foreign relations, but that the implied powers of 
both Congress and the judiciary generally put their assertions of 
inbound nonexecutive foreign relations power on better footing. 
As the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Zivotofsky v Kerry13 
 
 13 135 S Ct 2076 (2015). 
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(“Zivotofsky II”) demonstrates, the president can sometimes pre-
vail even in Youngstown Category 3.14 Similarly, Congress and 
the courts can prevail in converse Youngstown Category 3. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews tradi-
tional Youngstown analysis, highlighting how courts and non-
judicial actors have deployed Jackson’s tripartite framework. 
Part II defines a typology of nonexecutive foreign relations inci-
dents based on the constitutionally significant distinction be-
tween inbound and outbound foreign relations and proposes sev-
eral reasons why nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is 
likely to accelerate. Part III then develops the converse 
Youngstown framework and identifies the benefits it provides 
over both ad hoc and classic Youngstown analysis. 
I.  TRADITIONAL YOUNGSTOWN ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
The facts of Youngstown are well known. During the Korean 
War, a labor dispute arose between steel workers and steel com-
panies, and to avert a nationwide strike that would have jeopard-
ized the war effort, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive 
Order 10340, which authorized the secretary of commerce to seize 
and operate certain steel mills.15 The steel companies sued, argu-
ing that the seizure was unconstitutional.16 In a short opinion by 
Justice Hugo Black, the Supreme Court rejected the executive 
branch’s argument that the president had inherent constitutional 
power to issue the seizure order and invalidated the order on the 
ground that it effectively made law—a power entrusted to 
Congress, not the president.17 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence has long overshadowed Black’s 
majority opinion.18 Jackson, drawing on his own prior experience 
 
 14 Id at 2084, 2096 (holding that the president prevails in a Youngstown Category 3 
case in which the president, based on his power to recognize foreign sovereigns, defied a 
statute that purported to require him to list “Jerusalem, Israel” on passports). 
 15 Executive Order 10340 (1953), 3 CFR 65, 66. 
 16 Youngstown, 343 US at 583. 
 17 Id at 588–89. 
 18 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 94 (cited in note 1) (noting that Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence “has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of con-
current powers”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s 
Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,” 68 Albany L 
Rev 1127, 1128 (2005) (“It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in Youngstown for U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence.”); Edward T. Swaine, 
The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S Cal L Rev 263, 266 (2010) (noting that 
Jackson’s tripartite framework “has become Youngstown’s enduring legacy”). 
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as an executive-branch lawyer,19 took a functionalist, practice-
based approach to resolving separation-of-powers disputes.20 
Jackson recognized that “[p]residential powers are not fixed but 
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with 
those of Congress.”21 To channel judicial analysis of this presiden-
tial power fluctuation, Jackson proposed a tripartite framework.22 
Category 1 includes instances “[w]hen the President acts pur-
suant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”23 There 
the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it includes all 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can del-
egate.”24 Presidential actions in Category 1 are, according to 
Jackson, “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”25 
Category 2 involves presidential action and congressional si-
lence, creating a “zone of twilight in which [the president] and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain.”26 The president “can only rely upon his own in-
dependent powers,” but “congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, 
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity.”27 Unlike Categories 1 and 3, which each come with a 
 
 19 See, for example, Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s 
Great Supreme Court Justices 366–67 (Twelve 2010) (discussing the positions that Jackson 
had taken on executive power when he served as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attor-
ney general). Jackson cited his prior executive-branch experience in his opinion. 
Youngstown, 343 US at 634 (Jackson concurring) (“A judge, like an executive adviser, may 
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to con-
crete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.”) (emphasis 
added); id at 647 (Jackson concurring) (“[A] judge cannot accept self-serving press state-
ments of the attorney for one of the interested parties as authority in answering a consti-
tutional question, even if the advocate was himself.”). 
 20 See Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring) (arguing that “[t]he actual 
art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions 
of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context,” but rather “the Constitution [ ] contemplates that practice will integrate 
the dispersed powers into a workable government”). 
 21 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 22 Id at 635–38 (Jackson concurring). 
 23 Id at 635 (Jackson concurring). 
 24 Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring). 
 25 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring). 
 26 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 27 Id (Jackson concurring). 
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substantive presumption or guide as to the ultimate constitu-
tional outcome,28 Jackson is vague as to how courts should ap-
proach Category 2 cases. He notes only that the resolution of 
Category 2 cases will “likely [ ] depend on the imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on ab-
stract theories of law.”29 
Finally, Category 3 involves instances in which “the Presi-
dent takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress.”30 In Category 3, the president’s “power is at its 
lowest ebb,” encompassing “his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”31 Jackson 
instructs that courts, which must “scrutiniz[e] with caution” pres-
idential actions in Category 3, can uphold the president’s actions 
“only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject,”32 
that is, by holding the issue to be within the president’s sole “do-
main and beyond control by Congress.”33 Jackson deemed 
Truman’s steel seizure to be a Category 3 case and accordingly 
voted to invalidate the executive order.34 
Until 2015, the president had never prevailed in a Category 3 
case in the Supreme Court. That changed in Zivotofsky II. The 
Court held that the president has the exclusive power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns and therefore that the president could defy a 
congressional statute that purported to allow a US citizen born in 
Jerusalem to have his place of birth listed as “Israel” in his pass-
port.35 Chief Justice John Roberts noted in dissent the unprece-
dented nature of the president’s Category 3 win, asserting that 
“[n]ever before has this Court accepted a President’s direct defi-
ance of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”36 
 
 28 See Youngstown, 343 US at 637–38 (Jackson concurring). See also Swaine, 83 S 
Cal L Rev at 280 (cited in note 18) (“In the judiciary’s hands, at least, Jackson’s categories 
serve both a sorting function (identifying which category applies to a given case) and a 
standard-setting function (articulating how each set of circumstances should be scruti-
nized).”) (emphasis omitted). 
 29 Youngstown, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring). See also id at 637 n 3 (Jackson 
concurring) (discussing President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus at the start of the Civil War and Congress’s later ratification of that action). 
 30 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring). 
 31 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 32 Id at 637–38 (Jackson concurring). 
 33 Youngstown, 343 US at 640 (Jackson concurring). 
 34 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 35 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2081, 2096. 
 36 Id at 2113 (Roberts dissenting). 
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Jackson himself recognized in Youngstown that the tripartite 
framework was “over-simplified”37—a characterization scholars 
and the Court have echoed38—and that it only “roughly” distin-
guishes the “legal consequences” of the different permutations of 
presidential action and congressional approval, silence, and 
disapproval.39 
Nonetheless, Jackson’s framework for analyzing the consti-
tutionality of presidential actions in areas of claimed concurrent 
congressional power has proven to be an enduring and popular 
method for evaluating separation-of-powers questions. The 
Supreme Court has cited Jackson’s concurrence in dozens of 
cases, including in nineteen majority opinions.40 The executive 
branch also often relies on Jackson’s opinion. The Office of Legal 
 
 37 Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring). 
 38 See, for example, Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 669 (1981) (“[I]t is doubt-
less the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of 
three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit con-
gressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”); Daniel Bodansky and 
Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 Vand J Transnatl L 885, 897 (2016) (endorsing the 
understanding of the Youngstown framework as a spectrum, rather than an oversimplified 
three-category scheme). 
 39 Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring). 
 40 The majority opinions that cite Jackson’s concurrence include: Old Dominion 
Branch No 496 v Austin, 418 US 264, 273 n 5 (1974); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 
707 (1974); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); Nixon v Administrator of 
General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977); Chrysler Corp v Brown, 441 US 281, 306 n 37 
(1979); Dames & Moore, 453 US at 660–62, 668–69, 674, 678; Bowsher, 478 US 714, 721–
22 (1986); Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 694 (1988); Mistretta v United States, 488 US 
361, 381, 386, 408 (1989); United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 394 (1990); 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc, 501 US 252, 276 n 22 (1991); Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California, 
512 US 298, 329 (1994); Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681, 696–98, 701 n 35 (1997); Loving v 
United States, 517 US 748, 756 (1996); Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 
363, 375 (2000); American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 414–15, 427 
(2003); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 742–43 (2008); Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491, 
524–25, 527–30 (2008); Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2083–84, 2087. For other cases in which 
Justices cite Jackson’s concurrence in concurrences or dissents, see, for example, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919, 962 (1983) (Powell con-
curring in the judgment); id at 978, 984 (White dissenting); Clinton v City of New York, 
524 US 417, 472 (1998) (Breyer dissenting); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 552 (2004) 
(Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 562–63 (Scalia dissenting); id at 
583–85 (Thomas dissenting); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy con-
curring in part); Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 
US 477, 519 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); Zivotofsky v Clinton, 566 US 189, 215 (2012) 
(“Zivotofsky I”) (Breyer dissenting). The circuit courts have also relied heavily on Jack-
son’s opinion, citing it in well over one hundred cases as of early 2018. 
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Counsel (OLC) has cited Jackson’s concurrence in dozens of opin-
ions,41 including to analyze issues like the scope of the treaty 
power42 and war powers.43 
Many of the separation-of-powers disputes to which the 
Youngstown framework applies do not end up before courts due 
to problems of standing or justiciability, among others.44 The use 
of Youngstown outside the courts—by the executive and 
Congress—is at least as important as its use within them, and 
more fraught because of the absence of an authoritative decider 
to resolve disputes between the branches.45 
Reliance on Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence is often cou-
pled with resort to another separate opinion in Youngstown, 
namely the concurring opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter. 
Frankfurter’s concurrence emphasized the importance of histori-
cal practice to understanding the constitutional separation of 
powers. He explained, “[A] systematic, unbroken, executive prac-
tice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn 
 
 41 A search of Westlaw’s “U.S. Attorney General Opinions” database for “Youngstown 
/s Jackson” retrieves thirty OLC opinions, as of February 7, 2018, that cite Jackson’s con-
curring opinion. 
 42 See, for example, Office of Legal Counsel, Validity of Congressional-Executive 
Agreements That Substantially Modify the United States’ Obligations under an Existing 
Treaty, 20 Op Off Legal Counsel 389, 395 (Nov 25, 1996) (applying Jackson’s framework 
in determining that Congress may authorize the president to modify via executive agree-
ment US obligations under a preexisting treaty); Office of Legal Counsel, Whether 
Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op Off Legal Counsel 
232, 244 (Nov 22, 1994) (relying on Jackson’s framework to conclude that the joint author-
ity of the president plus Congress means that an international agreement need not be 
concluded as an Article II treaty). 
 43 See, for example, Office of Legal Counsel, Deployment of United States Armed 
Forces into Haiti, 18 Op Off Legal Counsel 173, 173, 175 (Sept 27, 1994) (relying on 
Jackson’s framework to conclude that the president had authority to deploy US military 
forces into Haiti). 
 44 See Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 Harv 
L Rev 112, 133 (2015) (noting that “[s]eparation-of-powers disputes between the branches 
in foreign relations—including direct clashes of the sort at issue in Zivotofsky II—arise all 
the time but are rarely adjudicated” due to “the absence of a plaintiff with standing and a 
cause of action,” the political question doctrine, and other justiciability problems). 
 45 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550, 
2617 (2014) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“It is not every day that we encounter a 
proper case or controversy requiring interpretation of the Constitution’s structural provi-
sions. Most of the time, the interpretation of those provisions is left to the political 
branches.”); Bodansky and Spiro, 49 Vand J Transnatl L at 919–20 (cited in note 38) 
(“Much of the constitutional law of foreign relations has developed through practice out-
side the courts [because] of the modern judicial tendency to evade engaging the merits of 
foreign affairs disputes.”). 
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to uphold the Constitution . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘exec-
utive Power’ vested in the President.”46 The Supreme Court it-
self,47 as well as commentators48 and executive-branch entities,49 
have recognized the importance of “historical gloss” in resolving 
separation-of-powers questions. Appeals to historical practice 
“are particularly common in constitutional controversies impli-
cating foreign relations,”50 likely due to the implicit nature of 
many of the constitutional foreign affairs powers. Historical prac-
tice is often deployed in particular to argue that one branch has 
acquiesced in a claim of power by a coordinate branch.51 Like 
Jackson’s concurrence, Frankfurter’s opinion is relied on outside 
the courts.52 
Evidence from historical practice can complement Jackson’s 
tripartite framework. As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor 
Morrison have explained, “Historical practice is potentially rele-
vant in each of” the three Youngstown categories.53 Historical 
practice can shed light on: whether Congress supports or opposes 
presidential action, placing it in Categories 1 or 3; whether the 
president’s power in a Category 3 case is exclusive, leading to a 
presidential victory despite congressional opposition; and how 
 
 46 Youngstown, 343 US at 610–11 (Frankfurter concurring). 
 47 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560 (“[T]his Court has treated prac-
tice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice 
is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”); id at 
2594 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“[W]here a governmental practice has been 
open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice 
should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”). 
 48 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and 
the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 412–13 (2012) (highlighting that “[a]rgu-
ments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional sep-
aration of powers” and “are especially common in debates over the distribution of authority 
between Congress and the executive branch”). See also Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. 
Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum L Rev 
1097, 1108–09 & nn 45–47 (2013) (collecting scholarly uses of historical practice). 
 49 See, for example, Bradley and Morrison, 113 Colum L Rev at 1105–07 (cited in 
note 48) (discussing the prominent role that historical practice has played in opinions 
issued by OLC). 
 50 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 420 (cited in note 48). 
 51 See id at 414 (arguing that acquiescence is “[t]he most common reason” for invo-
cation of historical practice in separation-of-powers cases). 
 52 A search of Westlaw’s “U.S. Attorney General Opinions” database for “Youngstown 
/s Frankfurter” retrieves ten OLC opinions, as of February 7, 2018, that cite Frankfurter’s 
concurrence. See, for example, see Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force 
in Libya *7 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B9R5-L5YN (discussing “historical 
gloss” in the context of war powers).  
 53 Bradley and Morrison, 113 Colum L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 48). 
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power is allocated in areas of shared authority but congressional 
silence, that is, in Category 2.54 
The challenge with both Youngstown opinions is that they 
were written for and have since been applied primarily in in-
stances in which presidential actions are at issue. But the presi-
dent is not the only actor challenging the separation of powers. 
Increasingly, Congress and even the judiciary are conducting for-
eign relations, as detailed in the next Part. 
II.  NONEXECUTIVE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations (or “nonexecutive 
foreign relations” for short) requires a nonexecutive branch—the 
courts or Congress—to engage in or take actions that result in the 
opening of a channel of direct communications with a foreign ex-
ecutive branch. Nonexecutive foreign relations captures commu-
nications to and from foreign governments that are undertaken 
or purport to be undertaken in an official, institutional capacity, 
not communications undertaken in a personal (that is, unofficial) 
capacity. 
The boundaries of what counts as “conduct” of foreign rela-
tions may change depending on the circumstances. One possible 
definition of actions that should be considered “conduct” of foreign 
relations would be actions by a constitutionally significant major-
ity of a nonexecutive branch—for example, a majority of a court, 
a majority of both houses of Congress, or a supermajority of the 
Senate as required to ratify a treaty.55 In some circumstances, 
however, the actions of a constitutionally significant minority 
might be relevant. Consider, for example, communications to a 
foreign government by a minority of senators, but a minority suf-
ficient to block ratification of a treaty (that is, at least thirty-four). 
In other circumstances, the actions of even a single congressper-
son or judge could be sufficient to constitute the conduct of foreign 
relations. One district judge could accept a filing by a foreign gov-
ernment. One senator’s statements could interfere with treaty ne-
gotiations or adversely affect relations with a foreign government. 
The potential relevance of the actions of a single individual should 
not be surprising. Much of US foreign relations is conducted by 
 
 54 See id at 1105; Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 419–20 (cited in note 48). 
 55 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (explaining that the president “shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur”). 
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individual executive-branch officials (albeit with significant sup-
port from staff and others in the executive branch). The United 
States deploys one ambassador to each country, plus a number of 
subject-matter-specific ambassadors to international gatherings 
and institutions. 
Whether the actions of less than a constitutionally significant 
majority of a nonexecutive branch constitute the conduct of for-
eign relations will be a fact-specific inquiry. Relevant factors 
could include the perception of the foreign government involved: 
Would that government be likely to believe that the conduct is 
significant? Another factor could be to consider a substitution ef-
fect. If the nonexecutive official’s or officials’ actions effectively 
substitute for an action that could be or has previously been done 
by the executive, then the nonexecutive’s action constitutes con-
duct of foreign relations. 
Nonexecutive foreign relations provides examples of diagonal 
transnational networks—that is, transnational networks be-
tween one country’s executive branch and another country’s leg-
islature or judiciary.56 The existence of transnational networks 
among government officials has garnered significant attention in 
recent years.57 Scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have focused 
on the disaggregation of modern states into component parts, 
such as judiciaries, legislatures, and regulatory agencies that en-
gage with their counterparts abroad.58 But while existing scholar-
ship has focused primarily on “[h]orizontal government networks” 
 
 56 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 Va L 
Rev 289, 291–92 (2016) (coining the term “diagonal” to describe transnational networks 
between foreign executive branches and the US judiciary, specifically in the context of 
foreign sovereign amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court). See also Peter J. Spiro, 
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St L J 649, 722–23 (2002) 
(noting, in discussing disaggregation of national governments, that the participation of 
foreign governments in foreign relations cases is “becoming routine”); Zachary D. Clopton, 
Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 Stan L Rev *5 (forthcoming 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8W6Q-KQ8H (adopting the “diagonal” idea to describe “diagonal public en-
forcement” in which foreign executive branches use US courts to enforce US law). 
 57 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 31 (Princeton 2004) 
(arguing that as the state “disaggregat[es],” “[i]ts component institutions—regulators, 
judges, and even legislators—are all reaching out beyond national borders” and “creat[ing] 
horizontal networks” with their foreign counterparts). See also generally, for example, Kal 
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law, 43 Va J Intl L 1 (2002) (discussing the rise and import 
of transnational regulatory networks). 
 58 See Slaughter, A New World Order at 12 (cited in note 57) (discussing the idea of 
the “disaggregated state” as “the rising need for and capacity of different domestic govern-
ment institutions to engage in activities beyond their borders, often with their foreign 
counterparts,” and identifying examples including “regulators pursuing the subjects of 
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“link[ing] [ ] counterpart national officials across borders”—judge 
to judge, legislature to legislature, regulator to regulator59—non-
executive foreign relations involves diagonal networks running 
from the US judiciary or legislature to foreign governments’ exec-
utive branches.60 These diagonal transgovernmental interactions 
raise different issues from the horizontal governmental networks 
and pose serious questions for the US constitutional system and 
the conduct of US foreign relations.61 
The next Section uses examples to develop a typology of non-
executive foreign relations. 
A. A Typology of Nonexecutive Conduct of Foreign Relations 
Nonexecutive foreign relations can be inbound or outbound. 
Inbound instances involve Congress or the courts receiving com-
munications from foreign executives, whereas outbound in-
stances involve US nonexecutive branches transmitting commu-
nications directly to foreign governments. Some examples of 
nonexecutive foreign relations involve aspects of both inbound 
and outbound. For example, Speaker Boehner’s invitation to 
Prime Minister Netanyahu was an outbound communication that 
solicited an inbound communication—Netanyahu’s address to 
Congress. 
Both inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign relations 
have constitutional implications. The Constitution affords the 
president the power to conduct both outbound foreign relations by 
appointing ambassadors “by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate”62 and inbound foreign relations by “receiv[ing] Am-
bassadors and other public Ministers.”63 The Supreme Court’s 
 
their regulations across borders; judges negotiating minitreaties with their foreign breth-
ren to resolve complex transnational cases; and legislators consulting on the best ways to 
frame and pass legislation affecting human rights or the environment”). 
 59 Id at 13. See also id at 19 (“The structural core of a disaggregated world order is a 
set of horizontal networks among national government officials in their respective issue 
areas, ranging from central banking through antitrust regulation and environmental pro-
tection to law enforcement and human rights protection.”); id at 13–14 (contemplating 
“vertical government networks, those between national government officials and their supra-
national counterparts,” such as the relationship between national courts in Europe and 
the European Court of Justice). 
 60 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 291–92 (cited in note 56) (originating the idea of 
diagonal transnational networks). 
 61 See Part III. 
 62 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. 
 63 US Const Art II, § 3. 
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Zivotofsky II opinion cites the president’s powers as to both in-
bound and outbound foreign relations to support its conclusion 
that “Congress . . . has no constitutional power that would enable 
it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.”64 The 
Court in United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp65 put the 
point even more bluntly, stating that “the President alone has the 
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”66 
As the examples in this Section show, however, there are in 
fact both multiple speakers and multiple listeners when it comes 
to the US government’s interactions with foreign governments.67 
The converse Youngstown framework set out in the next Part will 
explore which nonexecutive foreign relations scenarios, with their 
multiplication of speakers and listeners, are constitutionally per-
missible and which are constitutionally problematic. 
1. Inbound. 
The most basic example of inbound nonexecutive foreign re-
lations occurs with respect to courts. The judiciary routinely re-
ceives filings from foreign sovereigns that are plaintiffs or defend-
ants in cases before the courts.68 The Supreme Court has noted 
the “long-settled general rule” that “a foreign nation is generally 
entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United 
 
 64 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2086. 
 65 299 US 304 (1936). 
 66 Id at 319. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket No 13-
628, *21 (US Nov 3, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 7661633) (reflecting Justice 
Elena Kagan’s statement that “what we usually say about diplomatic communication is 
that whatever Congress’s other foreign affairs powers are, the power of diplomatic com-
munication belongs to the President and the President alone; that in that realm we only 
speak with one voice”). 
 67 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 301 (cited in note 56) (“Although the Court has 
repeatedly stated that the United States must speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign relations—
the President’s voice—its acceptance of foreign sovereign amicus briefs makes clear that 
there are multiple listeners in the U.S. government.”) (citation omitted). 
 68 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and 
the Case against “Judicial Imperialism,” 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 653, 666–67 (2016) (de-
scribing and creating a typology of claims brought by foreign governments as plaintiffs in 
US courts); Clopton, 70 Stan L Rev at *5 (cited in note 56) (discussing one species of claims 
brought by foreign governments as plaintiffs). Foreign governments are also frequently 
defendants in US courts, and in that posture, their susceptibility to suit is governed by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act §§ 2(a), 3, 4(a), 5, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891, 2891–
98 (1976), codified at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601–11. Court communica-
tions to foreign government parties in such cases could also be considered outbound 
nonexecutive foreign relations. 
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States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or individ-
ual might do.”69 This entitlement is limited to governments that 
are “at peace with” and “recognized by the United States,”70 a sta-
tus that the Court has held to be subject to the executive’s deter-
mination.71 In a recent article, Professor Hannah Buxbaum iden-
tified nearly “300 claims lodged by foreign sovereigns in U.S. 
courts.”72 All of these filings are examples of nonexecutive foreign 
relations: communications between a foreign sovereign and a non-
executive branch of the US government, namely the judiciary. 
In addition to filing with US courts when they are parties to 
cases, foreign sovereigns also communicate with US courts as 
amici curiae. One important example of the Supreme Court as a 
nonexecutive foreign relations actor stems from the Court’s insti-
gation of a shift in the filing practices of foreign governments.73 
Prior to 1978, foreign governments that wished to provide their 
views to the Supreme Court about pending cases in which they 
were not parties sometimes filed amicus briefs directly with the 
Court but more often transmitted diplomatic notes to the State 
Department, which passed the notes to the solicitor general who 
then filed them with the Court.74 In a 1978 case, however, the 
diplomatic-note practice caused concern at oral argument. Zenith 
Radio Corp v United States75 raised issues about international 
trade, and the United States, which was the respondent, trans-
mitted diplomatic notes from the European Commission and 
Japan, which supported the petitioner.76 
The State Department’s Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law chronicles the Supreme Court’s action and the 
Justice and State Departments’ responses.77 In a letter to State 
Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell, Solicitor General 
Wade H. McCree explained that the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
wrote to McCree “stating that the procedure of transmitting dip-
lomatic notes to the Court is not authorized by the Court’s rules,” 
 
 69 Pfizer, Inc v India, 434 US 308, 318–19 (1978). 
 70 Id at 319–20. 
 71 Id at 320 (“[I]t is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to determine 
which nations are entitled to sue.”). 
 72 Buxbaum, 73 Wash & Lee L Rev at 656 (cited in note 68). 
 73 For a more extensive treatment of foreign sovereign amici, see generally 
Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note 56). 
 74 Id at 297–98. 
 75 437 US 443 (1978). 
 76 See Marian Lloyd Nash, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 
1978 561 (US Department of State 1980). 
 77 Id at 560–63. 
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and that “foreign governments ordinarily should make their 
presentations to the Supreme Court in a way authorized by the 
Court’s rules.”78 McCree noted that the Japanese diplomatic note 
“became a subject of concern” during oral argument in Zenith 
Radio, and he concluded: 
[T]he fact that the note was provided to the Court by us [the 
United States] as a litigant in the case tended to confuse the 
presentation of the issues in a way that did not improve the 
prospect that the final decision would be favorable to the in-
terests of the Government of Japan.79 
McCree therefore suggested that the State Department “discour-
age foreign governments from presenting diplomatic notes to the 
Department of State with requests that the notes be transmitted 
to the Supreme Court” and instead “request foreign governments 
to communicate their views to the judicial branch through the 
more effective method preferred by that branch—the filing of for-
mal briefs.”80 
In a circular diplomatic note transmitted to embassies in 
Washington, the State Department informed foreign govern-
ments of the Supreme Court clerk’s letter to the solicitor general 
and explained that the State Department would “no longer trans-
mit diplomatic notes submitted to it by foreign governments with 
respect to cases pending in the Supreme Court” or federal courts 
of appeals.81 The State Department noted that the Supreme Court 
rules permit “any person to file a brief as amicus curiae with the 
consent of the parties to the case, or by motion in the absence of 
such consent” and that the courts of appeals have a similar rule.82 
The United States further precommitted that it would consent to 
the filing of a foreign sovereign amicus brief in any case in which 
it is a party, and noted that even if the other party refused con-
sent, the Court would “almost certainly grant the motion of a for-
eign government for leave to file a brief.”83 
 
 78 Id at 561 (reproducing Letter from Wade H. McCree, Solicitor General of the United 
States, to Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, May 2, 1978). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561 (cited in note 76). 
 81 Id at 560. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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The State Department also began declining foreign govern-
ments’ requests to convey to courts the foreign governments’ in-
tent not to file in particular cases.84 The Digest notes that the 
State Department’s decision to decline to transmit Canada’s deci-
sion not to file in a district-court case 
reflected a growing consensus within the U.S. Government 
that from a standpoint of international, as well as domestic, 
law, there was no reason why foreign governments should not 
in most cases present their views . . . to the courts in the 
United States directly rather than through the diplomatic 
channel.85 
The Supreme Court instigated a change in how foreign gov-
ernments communicate with the US judicial branch. Before the 
Supreme Court clerk’s letter to the solicitor general, foreign gov-
ernment amicus briefs were not unprecedented, but after the let-
ter and the State Department’s diplomatic note, they became the 
exclusive way in which foreign governments present their views 
to US courts.86 The Supreme Court effected this change indirectly. 
The Court did not itself directly communicate with foreign gov-
ernments; rather, it simply communicated to the Department of 
Justice that the department’s own filing of the diplomatic notes 
was not in compliance with the Court’s rules.87 It appears from 
the solicitor general’s portrayal of the events that it was the solic-
itor general who closed the loop between the Court’s letter—
stating that the filing of diplomatic notes was not authorized by 
the Court’s rules—and the filing of amicus briefs as a way for for-
eign governments to comply with the Court’s rules.88 And the ex-
ecutive branch went further than the Court suggested. The State 
Department declared that the executive branch would no longer 
transmit foreign governments’ views to either the Supreme Court 
 
 84 Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561–62 (cited in note 76) (explaining that 
in June 1978—after the solicitor general’s letter to the Legal Adviser had been received, 
but before the State Department communicated its new policy to the embassies—the State 
Department declined to relay Canada’s decision not to file in a particular case to the US 
District Court for the Southern District of New York). 
 85 Id at 562 (emphasis added). 
 86 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 298–302 (cited in note 56). 
 87 See Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561 (cited in note 76). This account 
corresponds to the way the solicitor general recounts the letter from the Supreme Court 
clerk in his letter to the State Department Legal Adviser. The Digest does not provide the 
text of the Supreme Court clerk’s letter. See id. 
 88 See id. 
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or the federal courts of appeals,89 nor would the executive transmit 
foreign governments’ decisions not to file.90 The State Department 
later extended the nontransmittal policy to federal district courts 
and to state courts, though maintaining that it would review such 
requests “on a case-by-case basis.”91 
In sum, the Supreme Court instigated the shift in practice 
from diplomatic notes to amicus briefs, thereby broadening a di-
rect, unmediated line of communication between foreign execu-
tives and the US judiciary, but the US executive branch con-
sented to and widened the scope of the communications channel 
by declining to transmit foreign governments’ views to any US 
court. As I explored in detail in a prior article,92 federal courts 
today routinely engage in inbound nonexecutive foreign relations 
by receiving foreign governments’ amicus briefs in addition to re-
ceiving filings by foreign sovereigns as parties. 
2. Mixed inbound/outbound. 
On January 21, 2015, Boehner invited Netanyahu to address 
a joint meeting of Congress about ongoing negotiations regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program.93 Foreign heads of state addressing 
Congress is not unusual.94 But the invitation to Netanyahu was 
unprecedented because it was not coordinated with the executive 
branch.95 Boehner admitted that he deliberately failed to notify 
 
 89 Id at 560. 
 90 Id at 561–62. 
 91 Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 73 Am J Intl L 669, 678–79 (1979). See also Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 
482 US 522, 554 n 5 (1987) (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
in 1987 that the State Department “in general does not transmit diplomatic notes from 
foreign governments to state or federal trial courts”). 
 92 See generally Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note 56). 
 93 Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives, to Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel (Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F3J9 
-UY2Q. See also Speaker Boehner Invites Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Address 
Congress (Speaker Boehner’s Press Office, Jan 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZK4L-SLTL. 
 94 See Joint Meeting & Joint Session Addresses before Congress by Foreign Leaders 
& Dignitaries (US House of Representatives, Sept 26, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FUB6-TD2P (providing a list of foreign leaders and dignitaries who have 
addressed Congress). 
 95 See Elizabeth A. Cobbs, Why Boehner’s Invite to Netanyahu Is Unconstitutional 
(Reuters, Mar 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WCE3-M23D (“Boehner’s decision to 
invite a foreign head of government to address Congress without first consulting the sit-
ting president has no precedent in American history.”); David Nakamura, Sean Sullivan, 
and David A. Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu to Address Congress as Part of 
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the White House of the invitation in order to “‘make sure there 
was no interference’ from the administration,”96 and he asserted 
that “Congress ‘can make this decision on its own.’”97 For its part, 
the White House noted that it learned of the invitation only 
shortly before Boehner publicly announced it, and that the invi-
tation was a “departure” from “typical protocol.”98 The White 
House further announced that President Barack Obama would 
not meet with Netanyahu, who faced an election in mid-March, 
because of a “long-standing practice and principle” of not meeting 
with “heads of state or candidates in close proximity to their elec-
tions, so as to avoid the appearance of influencing a democratic 
election in a foreign country.”99 
Boehner issued the invitation against the backdrop of conten-
tious negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. In his State of the 
Union address in January, Obama called on Congress to refrain 
from imposing additional sanctions on Iran while the United 
States and other powers negotiated a framework agreement with 
Iran to halt its nuclear program.100 Congressional Republicans 
and Netanyahu opposed the negotiations.101 The day he issued the 
invitation, Boehner reportedly told Republican lawmakers, 
“Obama ‘expects us to stand idly by and do nothing while he cuts 
 
Spurning of Obama (Wash Post, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5XT6-UT3A 
(explaining that the Netanyahu invitation “was a departure from normal procedure, in 
which the executive branch—and not a legislative leader—would coordinate the visit of a 
head of state”). 
 96 Nick Gass, Boehner Defends Netanyahu Invitation (Politico, Feb 15, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9U9R-LCHC (quoting House Speaker John Boehner). 
 97 Nakamura, Sullivan, and Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in 
note 95) (quoting Speaker Boehner). See also Background on Invitation to Prime Minister 
Netanyahu (Speaker John Boehner, Jan 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N9MM 
-C9QB (“As Speaker Boehner has said, the Congress is a separate and co-equal branch of 
government. It was the Speaker’s right to invite the Prime Minister of Israel.”). 
 98 Press Gaggle aboard Air Force One En Route Boise, Idaho (White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/42G2-ZK7S (quoting White 
House Press Secretary Joshua Earnest). 
 99 Krishnadev Calamur, Citing Proximity of Israeli Election, Obama Won’t Meet with 
Netanyahu (NPR, Jan 22, 2015), online at http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2015/01/22/379095373/israels-netanyahu-accepts-invitation-to-address 
-congress (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (quoting White House spokes-
woman Bernadette Meehan). 
 100 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (White Office of the Press 
Secretary, Jan 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FU6H-KGQP. 
 101 See Lisa Mascaro and Kathleen Hennessey, White House Says Boehner Broke 
Protocol with Netanyahu Invitation (LA Times, Jan 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EWE4-YJNP (noting that Netanyahu had “repeatedly warned against eas-
ing sanctions against Iran and supported adopting a tougher approach”). 
2018] Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations 631 
 
a bad deal with Iran . . . . Two words: Hell no!’”102 Netanyahu, 
having accepted Boehner’s invitation, addressed Congress on 
March 3 and argued strenuously against the negotiations with 
Iran.103 
The invitation and Netanyahu’s subsequent speech appear to 
have been aimed at influencing US policy and public opinion with 
respect to negotiating with or sanctioning Iran.104 Boehner ex-
plained in an interview that: 
[W]hen it comes to the threat of Iran having a nuclear 
weapon—these are important messages that the Congress 
needs to hear and the American people need to hear. And I 
believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu is the perfect person 
to deliver the message of how serious this threat is.105 
He also claimed, however, that he was “trying to . . . strengthen 
the president’s hand” in the negotiations with Iran, presumably 
by threatening sanctions.106 Despite opposition from congres-
sional Republicans and Netanyahu, the United States and Iran, 
along with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union, reached agreement in July 
2015 on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s nu-
clear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.107 
Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu sparked debate among le-
gal commentators about whether Boehner’s actions complied with 
the Constitution. Some argued that the invitation was unconsti-
tutional because Article II, § 3 of the Constitution gives the 
president the exclusive power to “receive Ambassadors and other 
 
 102 Nakamura, Sullivan, and Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in 
note 95) (quotation marks omitted). 
 103 See The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress (Wash Post, Mar 
3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/662H-DZFR (arguing that the deal “doesn’t block 
Iran’s path to the bomb; it paves Iran’s path to the bomb”). 
 104 See note 257 and accompanying text. 
 105 Rep. John Boehner Sounds Off on Fight over Homeland Security Funding; 
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore Explains Stance on Same-Sex Marriage (Fox News, Feb 
15, 2015), online at http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2015/02/15/rep-john-boehner 
-sounds-fight-over-homeland-security-funding-alabama-chief-justice-roy (visited Feb 7, 
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (US Department of State), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FT2Z-P4CG. See also Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, World 
Leaders Strike Agreement with Iran to Curb Nuclear Ability and Lift Sanctions, NY Times 
A1 (July 15, 2015) (explaining the elements of the deal). 
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public Ministers.”108 Others argued in favor of the invitation’s con-
stitutionality on a variety of grounds. Some pointed to the evolu-
tion of less formal communications between congressmen and for-
eign governments to argue that constitutional practice supports 
the constitutionality of the invitation.109 Others argued that the 
president’s failure to exercise his constitutional power to bar 
Netanyahu’s entry into the United States constituted implied 
consent to the address to Congress.110 Another commentator sug-
gested that the invitation was constitutional because it did not 
interfere with the president’s power to receive ambassadors and 
because “[h]earing from foreign leaders . . . can support” congres-
sional powers, such as appropriating funds for foreign policy and 
ratifying treaties.111 
As these arguments reveal, commentators not only disagreed 
as to the ultimate constitutionality of the invitation, but also as 
to the appropriate framework with which to evaluate it. Part of 
the divergence stems from the fact that the Netanyahu incident 
has aspects of both inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign 
relations. Boehner’s initial invitation letter to Netanyahu was 
outbound—a direct communication to a foreign head of state from 
the legislative branch. Netanyahu’s acceptance and ultimate 
speech to Congress, on the other hand, were inbound—direct com-
munication from a foreign executive to a nonexecutive branch of 
the US government (here, Congress). Some of the dispute over the 
incident’s constitutionality involves dueling claims about author-
ity to conduct foreign relations versus Congress’s authority to re-
ceive information pertinent to fulfilling its functions. 
 
 108 US Const Art II, § 3. See also Michael Ramsey, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress 
Unconstitutional? (Originalism Blog, Jan 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D6YP 
-678V; David Bernstein, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (Wash 
Post, Jan 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CX96-VWT7. 
 109 See, for example, Peter Spiro, More on Boehner’s Netanyahu Invite (and What It 
Says about Constitutional Change) (Opinio Juris, Jan 27, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4QPF-3PW5; Ryan Scoville, Boehner Invites Bibi: A Closer Look at 
Historical Practice (Just Security, Jan 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U89W-FSVV 
(noting a long-standing practice of “legislative diplomacy” without taking a position on 
whether the differences in the Netanyahu invitation are “material in a constitutional 
sense”). 
 110 See, for example, Seth Barrett Tillman, A Response on Netanyahu’s Address to 
Congress (Originalism Blog, Jan 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3M6F-R4VU; 
Gerard Magliocca, Netanyahu’s Address to a Joint Session Is Not Unconstitutional 
(Concurring Opinions, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S744-R4PH. 
 111 Adam J. White, The Constitution Doesn’t Let President Close Congress’s Doors to 
Israel (Weekly Standard, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/R4RB-K6AA. 
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A more routine example of mixed inbound/outbound nonex-
ecutive foreign relations is congressional travel abroad.112 As 
Professor Ryan Scoville has documented, congressmen frequently 
visit foreign countries to inform themselves about issues re-
lated to their legislative responsibilities.113 Such trips are 
mixed inbound/outbound because in meetings with foreign gov-
ernment representatives, congressmen receive information and 
gather facts (inbound), but may also communicate messages (out-
bound). The executive branch often supports congressional travel 
abroad.114 
Sometimes, however, congressional travel proves controver-
sial. In 2007, then–Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, a 
Democrat from California, met with Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad and discussed a variety of regional security issues.115 
President George W. Bush criticized Pelosi’s visit on the ground 
that it “sen[t] mixed signals”116 at a time when the Bush admin-
istration was trying to isolate Syria diplomatically.117 
More recently, in January 2017, Representative Tulsi 
Gabbard, a Democrat from Hawaii, traveled to Syria on a “fact-
finding trip” and met with al-Assad.118 Gabbard had “called for the 
[Obama] administration to abandon all assistance to armed 
 
 112 See note 184 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 339–49 (cited in note 10). For examples of foreign 
travel by congresspersons, see Foreign Travel Reports (Office of the Clerk, US House of 
Representatives), archived at http://perma.cc/QW72-QDRY (providing a searchable data-
base of congressional foreign travel expenditures). Foreign travel reports are also pub-
lished in the Congressional Record. See, for example, Foreign Travel Financial Reports, 
115th Cong, 1st Sess, in 163 Cong Rec S 752–61 (daily ed Feb 6, 2017). 
 114 See note 184 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Hassan M. Fattah and Graham Bowley, Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader (NY 
Times, Apr 4, 2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/world/ 
middleeast/04cnd-pelosi.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (describ-
ing the issues discussed in the meeting). 
 116 President Bush Makes Remarks on the Emergency Supplemental (White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, Apr 3, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/T86Q-5VMX. 
 117 See David Stout and Hassan M. Fattah, Bush Assails Pelosi’s Trip to Syria (NY 
Times, Apr 3, 2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/world/americas/ 
03iht-pelosi.4.5130701.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable); Fattah and 
Bowley, Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader (cited in note 115) (noting that several 
Republican congressmen had also met with al-Assad, but that Bush did not mention them 
in criticizing Pelosi’s meeting). 
 118 Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard Returns from Syria with Renewed Calls: End 
Regime Change War in Syria Now (Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, Jan 25, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/SJ4U-UEFW. See also Tulsi Gabbard’s Syria Meeting with Assad 
Sparks Outcry (BBC, Jan 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/B6F6-ZE4Q. 
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groups and stop seeking Assad’s overthrow,”119 and fellow con-
gressmen criticized her meeting with Assad.120 Although the 
Defense Department was aware of Gabbard’s trip,121 neither 
Obama nor Trump administration officials commented on it.122 
Another possible, although so far hypothetical, example of 
mixed inbound/outbound nonexecutive foreign relations could 
come from the Supreme Court. The Court routinely “calls for the 
views of the solicitor general” (CVSGs), essentially inviting the 
executive branch to file a brief expressing its views on whether 
the Court should grant certiorari in a case or on which way the 
Court should rule on the merits.123 The Court occasionally calls 
for the views of parties other than the solicitor general. For exam-
ple, the Court has called for the views of the houses of Congress 
and states, among others.124 As the Court becomes increasingly 
accustomed to amicus briefs from foreign sovereigns, it might call 
for the views of a specific foreign government or governments in 
a future case in which the foreign sovereign’s views would be par-
ticularly material to the Court’s consideration. For example, in a 
case about extraterritorial application of US law—an issue on 
which the Court has been especially solicitous of foreign govern-
ments’ briefs125—the Court might request the views of govern-
ments whose domestic enforcement efforts would be impacted by 
application of US law abroad. Such an action by the Court would 
be analogous in form to the Netanyahu invitation: an invitation 
from a nonexecutive branch (outbound) for a foreign executive 
branch to provide its views to the Court (inbound). What the 
Court scenario would lack, of course, is the literal receiving of a 
 
 119 Karen DeYoung, Rep. Tulsi Gabbard Makes Unannounced Trip to Syria (Wash 
Post, Jan 18, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/76A4-GXF3. 
 120 See Mike Lillis, Gabbard Meeting with Assad Draws Disgust from Fellow 
Lawmakers (The Hill, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/EU7B-PK2X (collecting 
comments). 
 121 See id (quoting a Defense Department spokesman). 
 122 See Ryan Scoville, A Legal Analysis of Rep. Tulsi Gabbard’s Trip to Syria 
(Lawfare, Feb 14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2DZ9-C286 (arguing that the execu-
tive branch may have “quietly endorsed the trip: The Pentagon knew about it in advance, 
and yet there’s no public evidence of an objection”). 
 123 See Neal Devins and Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U Chi 
L Rev 859, 881–83 (2013) (detailing the frequency with which the Court requests the views 
of the solicitor general and the solicitor general’s perceived duty to respond). 
 124 Id at 883–84. 
 125 See, for example, Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247, 269–70 
(2010) (discussing amicus briefs filed by the United Kingdom, Australia, and France com-
plaining that extraterritorial application of US securities laws interferes with their secu-
rities regulations, and explaining that the Court’s test will avoid such interference). 
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foreign ambassador, and the Court’s request would also occur in 
the shadow of the executive branch’s own precommitment to con-
sent to the filing of any foreign sovereign amicus brief.126 
3. Outbound. 
The Iran nuclear deal negotiations sparked another example 
of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by Congress, specifi-
cally an outbound example.127 On March 9, 2015, forty-seven 
Republican senators, led by Senator Cotton, released an “Open 
Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”128 The letter 
began by noting that the Iranian leaders “may not fully under-
stand our constitutional system.”129 It then warned that the sena-
tors would regard an agreement “not approved by the Congress 
as nothing more than an executive agreement between President 
 
 126 See note 83 and accompanying text. 
 127 Instances of outbound nonexecutive foreign relations frequently raise questions 
about the Logan Act. See Logan Act, 1 Stat 613, 613 (1799), codified at 18 USC § 953: 
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of 
the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspond-
ence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, 
with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or 
of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with 
the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 
See also Steve Vladeck, The Iran Letter and the Logan Act (Lawfare, Mar 10, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/N26B-EY3U (arguing that there are significant legal and politi-
cal obstacles to prosecution of the Cotton letter signatories under the Logan Act); Peter 
Spiro, GOP Iran Letter Might Be Unconstitutional. Is It Also Criminal? (Opinio Juris, Mar 
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JNC6-RQE6 (arguing that the Cotton letter meets 
the elements of a Logan Act violation). See also Ryan Goodman, Many Think This Law Is 
Obsolete. It Could Actually Be a Big Problem for Trump. (Wash Post, Apr 5, 2017), archived 
at http://perma.cc/5CD5-UE7S (arguing that despite the lack of convictions under the 
Logan Act, it “has been ‘enforced’ and relied upon time and again by the executive branch,” 
including to expel “foreign ambassadors . . . for aiding and abetting violations” and to re-
strict and suspend US passports). The Logan Act, which has not been the basis for a pros-
ecution since 1803, see Vladeck, The Iran Letter (cited in note 127), stretches more broadly 
than outbound nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations because it covers any US citizen, 
not just legislative or judicial officials. But the Act is also narrower than nonexecutive 
foreign relations because it is limited to correspondence intended to influence a foreign 
government “in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States” or “to 
defeat the measures of the United States,” whereas outbound nonexecutive conduct of for-
eign relations is not so limited. 18 USC § 953. However, the two could interact if, for ex-
ample, debates about the constitutionality of instances of nonexecutive foreign relations 
were taken to shape the interpretation of “without authority of the United States” in the 
text of the Logan Act. Id. 
 128 Tom Cotton, et al, Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar 
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KZ73-5UX7. 
 129 Id. 
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Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei” that could be revoked by the 
next president or modified by Congress.130 After releasing the let-
ter, Cotton took the extraordinary step of tweeting the letter di-
rectly to Iranian leaders, including Ayatollah Khamenei, 
President Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.131 
Zarif responded by tweeting back a link to remarks in which he 
responded to the letter, calling it a “propaganda ploy” and “un-
precedented in diplomatic history” and arguing that the senators 
“do not understand international law.”132 
The senators intended the letter to undermine then ongoing 
negotiations over the nuclear deal,133 and the White House blasted 
their interference. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
called the letter “the continuation of a partisan strategy to under-
mine the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy and advance 
our national security interests around the globe,”134 and he noted 
that interfering in ongoing negotiations “is not [ ] the role that our 
Founding Fathers envisioned for Congress to play when it comes 
to foreign policy.”135 Vice President Joe Biden issued a strongly 
worded statement declaring that the letter “ignores two centuries 
of precedent and threatens to undermine the ability of any future 
American President, whether Democrat or Republican, to negoti-
ate with other nations on behalf of the United States.”136 Biden 
further highlighted the long history of US international agree-
ments made without Congress’s approval, and noted that in his 
thirty-six years in the Senate, he could not “recall another 
instance in which Senators wrote directly to advise another 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 See Megan Specia, Republican Senators’ Open Letter to Iran Sparks Fierce Twitter 
Spat (Mashable, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BC76-S599 (chronicling 
tweets). 
 132 Id (quoting the text of an article containing Zarif’s response). 
 133 Greg Jaffe and Sean Sullivan, Republican Letter to Iran Intensifies Dispute with 
White House (Wash Post, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X2XT-A9E2 (explain-
ing that the letter was “designed to kill any potential deal”); Peter Baker, G.O.P. Senators’ 
Letter to Iran about Nuclear Deal Angers White House (NY Times, Mar 9, 2015), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/asia/white-house-faults-gop-senators-letter-to 
-irans-leaders.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (“The letter ap-
peared aimed at unraveling a framework agreement even as negotiators drew close to 
reaching it.”). 
 134 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 3/9/2014 [sic] (White House Office 
of the Press Secretary, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GF8Y-VN66. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Statement by the Vice President on the March 9 Letter from Republican Senators 
to the Islamic Republic of Iran (White House Office of the Vice President, Mar 9, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/C7T2-FQBH. 
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country—much less a longtime foreign adversary—that the 
President does not have the constitutional authority to reach a 
meaningful understanding with them.”137 
Many commentators and media outlets derided the letter on 
a variety of grounds.138 Separation-of-powers concerns even made 
their way into major newspapers’ editorials. The Los Angeles 
Times, for example, argued, “[N]egotiating with foreign nations is 
the president’s job. The Republican senators’ meddling in that re-
sponsibility is outrageous.”139 The Boston Globe called the letter a 
“breathtakingly reckless intrusion into international diplomacy” 
that “undercuts the president’s traditional authority to oversee 
the shaping of foreign policy.”140 
Legal commentators debated similar issues.141 Professor Josh 
Chafetz has argued that the Cotton letter is constitutionally pro-
tected based on a broad understanding of the Speech and Debate 
Clause.142 Professor Julian Ku noted that the letter “could be 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 For a compilation of negative coverage of the letter, see Josh Earnest, Round-Up: 
Editorial Boards from around the Country Respond to the 47 Republican Senators (White 
House, Mar 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M93F-GMFQ. 
 139 Republican Senators Go Nuclear with Missive to Iran (LA Times, Mar 11, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/GRA4-ACB2. 
 140 GOP Letter to Iran Is a Reckless Intrusion into Nuclear Talks (Boston Globe, Mar 
10, 2015), online at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/03/10/gop-letter 
-iran-was-reckless-intrusion-into-nuclear-talks/ztJVtjcXFo1jBUDz8P03kJ/story.html 
(visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 141 Academics also raised additional concerns about the letter. For example, Professor 
Jack Goldsmith pointed out that the letter erred in stating that the Senate ratifies trea-
ties, when in fact the Senate votes on a resolution of ratification that, if approved, allows 
the president to ratify. Jack Goldsmith, The Error in the Senators’ Letter to the Leaders of 
Iran (Lawfare, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UCP3-9NXK. The letter also 
sparked a separate discussion of whether the signatories violated the Logan Act. See 
note 127. 
 142 Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of 
Powers 229–31 (Yale 2017). Because of the many constitutional powers of Congress that 
relate to foreign relations, Chafetz is certainly correct that “we should be deeply skeptical 
of any attempt to give the president the sole authority to define, construct, and delimit 
American interests or positions on the world stage.” Id at 230. However, Congress’s powers 
to help define US interests and shape foreign policy through the confirmation of executive-
branch officials, the power of the purse, and voting on treaties, among others, do not nec-
essarily mean that Congress has or should have constitutional sanction to conduct foreign 
relations as I and other foreign relations scholars define that term. See note 1 and accom-
panying text. In stating that “multiple institutions of government—most definitely includ-
ing the members and houses of Congress—take part in conducting foreign relations,” 
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 230 (cited in note 142), Chafetz appears to use a 
broader understanding of “conduct,” though he also endorses congressional conduct of for-
eign relations, narrowly defined. See id at 231 (endorsing the constitutionality of the 
Cotton letter and arguing, with approval, that “[b]y purporting to write directly to the 
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criticized as an unconstitutional interference in the President’s 
inherent power to conduct foreign affairs” and “is very unu-
sual.”143 He nonetheless concluded that the letter “skirts, but 
manages to avoid, any unconstitutional interference” because it 
“does not state U.S. policy” and is instead “[p]hrased merely as a 
letter ‘bringing attention’ to the U.S. constitutional system.”144 
Professors Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, on the other hand, 
argued that the letter was a “flagrant violation of at least the 
spirit” of the principle that “the President is the sole representa-
tive of the United States ‘with foreign nations’” and, “in the words 
of the Supreme Court, ‘the President alone has the power to 
speak’ with other states on America’s behalf.”145 Professor Marty 
Lederman similarly noted that the letter “is deeply transgressive 
of constitutional values and traditions,” if not of the Constitution 
itself.146 
As the executive-branch, popular-media, and legal-expert re-
actions to the Cotton letter reveal, the senators’ direct communi-
cation to a foreign government during delicate negotiations and 
in an overt attempt to interfere with those negotiations is at 
least constitutionally troubling, if not strictly violative of the 
Constitution. 
The Cotton letter incident shares some similarities with a 
historical antecedent. In 1984, ten Democratic congressmen sent 
a letter to Nicaragua’s then–Coordinator of the Junta of National 
Reconstruction—who later became President—Daniel Ortega 
urging him to ensure free and open elections.147 Known as the 
“Dear Comandante” letter,148 the missive explained that the 
congressional signatories opposed the Reagan administration’s 
support of “military action directed against the people or govern-
ment of Nicaragua,” and argued that if Ortega held free and open 
 
Iranian regime, the signatories to the letter asserted that they were . . . entitled to a seat 
at the diplomatic table”). 
 143 Julian Ku, 47 US Senators Send Iran’s Leader an Unnecessary(?) Primer on 
How US Constitution Works (Opinio Juris, Mar 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9ETL-EPQZ. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, Legal Flaws in the 47 Senators’ Letter to Iran (Just 
Security, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2BGA-J92S, quoting Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp, 299 US at 319. 
 146 Marty Lederman, The Cotton Letter . . . and the Vice President’s Response (Just 
Security, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8LE-PE6F. 
 147 See Jim Wright, et al, Ten Congressmen Send a Message to Managua, Wall St J 
34 (Apr 17, 1984) (reprinting the full text of the letter). See also Steven V. Roberts, 
Congress; Letter to Nicaragua: ‘Dear Comandante,’ NY Times A14 (Apr 20, 1984). 
 148 See, for example, That ‘Dear Comandante’ Letter, Wash Post A20 (May 3, 1984). 
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elections, “[t]hose responsible for supporting violence against 
your government . . . would have far greater difficulty winning 
support for their policies.”149 Newt Gingrich, then a Republican 
congressman, condemned the letter, arguing that it “clearly vio-
lates the constitutional separation of powers” and “undercut[s] 
the [Reagan] Administration’s foreign policy.”150 
More than a year later, the Reagan administration’s 
Secretary of State George Shultz gave a speech criticizing the let-
ter and trips by congressmen to Nicaragua, arguing that the 
Reagan administration “‘cannot conduct a successful policy’ to-
ward Nicaragua when legislators” act as “self-appointed emissar-
ies to the communist regime.”151 Shultz also noted, however, that 
congressmen have the right to travel to and review the situation 
in Nicaragua,152 and after meeting with Democratic congressmen 
later in the day, he “reversed course,” telling reporters that “any 
phrase that might be interpreted as criticism” of the congressmen 
“is not a proper interpretation.”153 
B. Drivers of Nonexecutive Foreign Relations 
The phenomenon of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations 
is not new. For decades, foreign governments have filed amicus 
briefs, and congressmen have intervened with foreign govern-
ments for even longer.154 But the salience of nonexecutive conduct 
of foreign relations increased in 2015 with the Netanyahu address 
to Congress and the Cotton letter. Some of the drivers discussed 
below suggest that although nonexecutive foreign relations have 
occurred in the past, they are likely to be more frequent going 
forward. 
Technology.  Technology facilitates communication, and 
communications among government actors are no exception. 
 
 149 Ten Congressmen Send a Message to Managua, Wall St J at 34 (cited in note 147). 
 150 Roberts, Congress; Letter to Nicaragua, NY Times at A14 (cited in note 147). 
 151 Don Oberdorfer, Shultz Backs Off Attack on Meddling by Congress; Lawmakers 
Confront Him about Nicaragua, Wash Post A24 (May 24, 1985). 
 152 See R. Gregory Nokes, Reagan, Shultz Criticize Congress on Nicaragua; 
Lawmakers Don’t Like It (Associated Press, May 24, 1985). 
 153 Oberdorfer, Shultz Backs Off Attack on Meddling by Congress, Wash Post at A24 
(cited in note 151) (quoting Shultz and noting that Shultz “seem[ed] to exonerate the au-
thors of the letter”). 
 154 See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 351–54 (cited in note 10) (discussing the history of 
congressional contacts with foreign governments). 
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Advanced communications technology is not necessary for non-
executive foreign relations communications,155 but it does make 
communications across borders faster, cheaper, and easier. Schol-
ars have argued that the information technology revolution has 
spurred global networks both among government officials and 
outside of governments.156 In a study of transgovernmental net-
works among regulatory agencies, for example, Professor Kal 
Raustiala noted that every regulator he interviewed cited “ad-
vances in information technologies . . . as a central permissive 
cause of the contemporary network phenomenon.”157 
In the same way that they enable horizontal governmental 
networks, technological advances facilitate diagonal communica-
tions between foreign executives and US nonexecutive branches. 
New technologies may just replace earlier counterparts in the 
way that email can substitute for a mailed letter or a fax machine. 
But as Cotton’s tweets to Iranian leaders and the Iranian foreign 
minister’s tweeted response reveal,158 new technologies can also 
create communication channels that are different in kind from 
prior options. 
Sophistication about disaggregation.  Another driver leading 
foreign executive branches to engage the US judiciary and 
Congress may be foreign governments’ increasing sophistication 
about the relative powers of the branches of the US government. 
As foreign executive branches interact directly with parts of the 
US government other than the State Department, they may come 
to better understand the policy process within the United States 
and the policy bottlenecks and power centers. This understanding 
may reveal more diverse avenues of engagement than the tradi-
tional State Department–foreign ministry route. For example, 
Professor Peter Spiro has argued that foreign governments’ “in-
creasing sophistication . . . when it comes to internal U.S. govern-
ance structures” has led them to “play the system directly” by 
“participat[ing] in U.S. judicial proceedings not just as defendants 
 
 155 See notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Genet episode). 
 156 See, for example, Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 12 (cited in note 57) (“Technolog-
ical advances provide the means for networks to develop with greater frequency and at 
lower cost.”); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Georgetown L J 487, 
497 (2005) (“The revolution in information technology [ ] has produced a worldwide com-
munications capacity that empowers and energizes loose networks of nongovernmental 
organizations and so-called ‘epistemic communities,’ which as a result play an increasingly 
important role in shaping the global agenda.”) (citation omitted). 
 157 Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 12 (cited in note 57). 
 158 See notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
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(which more likely involves a lack of sophistication) but increas-
ingly as plaintiffs and amici curiae.”159 While existing scholarship 
has explored how disaggregation impacts international law and 
US compliance with international law,160 this Article takes a dif-
ferent approach, focusing instead on the constitutional implica-
tions of foreign governments’ interactions with the disaggregated 
pieces of the federal government. 
Fractionalization in the United States.  Advances in commu-
nications technology and increased knowledge among foreign gov-
ernments about the US system help to create the conditions for 
nonexecutive foreign relations, but they do not explain what 
causes nonexecutive foreign relations to move from potential to 
actual. The trigger for many of the instances of nonexecutive for-
eign relations discussed above, particularly those undertaken by 
Congress, appears to be serious policy disagreements between 
government officials of opposing political parties.161 
Divided government—when one party controls the presi-
dency and the other party controls Congress—may foster non-
executive foreign relations. In such a circumstance, the party con-
trolling Congress can use levers of congressional authority, such 
as issuing invitations and engaging in foreign travel, to engage in 
nonexecutive foreign relations. The Netanyahu invitation and the 
Cotton letter are prominent examples: Republican leaders of 
Congress used the powers of their offices in an attempt to derail 
the foreign policy of a Democratic president.162 
 
 159 Spiro, 63 Ohio St L J at 683 (cited in note 56) (citations omitted). See also generally 
Buxbaum, 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 653 (cited in note 68) (assessing the claims that foreign 
governments bring as plaintiffs in US courts); Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note 
56) (analyzing the role of foreign governments as amici curiae). 
 160 See, for example, Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 91–92 (cited in note 57) (discuss-
ing the impact of transgovernmental networks on international law); Peter J. Spiro, 
Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 L & Contemp Probs 195, 196 
(Autumn 2004) (exploring how “disaggregated governmental components beyond the tra-
ditional foreign policy apparatus[ ] may be developing an institutional interest in the ac-
ceptance of” international law). 
 161 Examples include, among others, Democrat Pelosi’s trip to Syria during the 
Republican Bush administration, see notes 115–17 and accompanying text; Republican 
Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu during the Democratic Obama administration, see 
notes 93–107 and accompanying text; and the Cotton letter by Republican senators during 
the Obama administration, see notes 127–137 and accompanying text. 
 162 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L J 2, 4–12 
(2014) (proposing that unilateral executive actions by the Obama administration should 
be conceived of as “constitutional self-help”—the use of generally impermissible means 
that become permissible because done in response to a prior impermissible act by 
Congress). Some commentators have argued that the Netanyahu invitation was a form of 
congressional self-help in retaliation for perceived executive unilateralism on other issues 
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But divided government is not necessary for nonexecutive 
foreign relations to occur. Examples of nonexecutive foreign rela-
tions from the courts do not depend on the same political dynam-
ics as executive-legislative divided government. Moreover, even 
when a single party controls both the presidency and Congress, 
minority legislators may attempt to engage in nonexecutive for-
eign relations using different tactics than a legislative majority 
has at its disposal. In fact, unified government may increase 
the odds of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by minor-
ity legislators: if policy divisions and fractionalization make 
working with the executive and legislative majority untenable, 
minority legislators may have a greater incentive to engage in 
nonexecutive foreign relations through in-person visits abroad or 
sending of messages precisely because they lack other mecha-
nisms for affecting policy. 
Fractionalization in the US political system incentivizes 
not just US actors but also foreign countries to engage in non-
executive foreign relations. The existence of deep disagree-
ments—if not outright animosity—between US government 
branches or majority and minority parties makes it prudent for 
foreign governments to attempt to engage multiple actors to un-
derstand the full range of views held by those with some potential 
to influence US policy, either currently or after the next election 
cycle. Fractionalization also creates the possibility that foreign 
governments can forum shop. If a foreign government is stymied 
by the executive branch, it might find a more receptive audience 
in Congress or the courts.163 Netanyahu’s address to Congress, for 
 
or executive resistance to cooperation over inviting Netanyahu. See, for example, 
Bernstein, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (cited in note 108) (sug-
gesting that Boehner viewed the invitation as self-help based on an interview in which, as 
reported by Bernstein, Boehner “suggested that given that President Obama has been 
ignoring Congress’ constitutional prerogatives, as by unilaterally rewriting immigration 
law, Congress can retaliate by ignoring the president’s constitutional prerogatives”); Josh 
Blackman, Gridlock and Congressional Power (Josh Blackman’s Blog, Jan 26, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9M24-CTUR (citing Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu as a po-
tential example of self-help per Professor David E. Pozen and noting that “[u]nder normal 
circumstances, the President would likely approve of the Speaker wishing to invite the 
[Prime Minister] of an ally to address Congress. But we are not living in normal times”). 
To the extent that a desire to engage in self-help may describe the instances of non-
executive foreign relations that I discuss, I consider “self-help” as a descriptive label here, 
not one with the normative, justificatory import that Pozen separately proposes. 
 163 Spiro, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 215 (cited in note 160) (“The United States is no 
longer a monolith for purposes of international law and relations; it is now, rather, an 
arena in which global forces can play at the game of transnational politics and rational 
institutional action.”). 
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example, seemed designed precisely to find a friendly audience, 
avoiding Obama, with whom Netanyahu had had a troubled rela-
tionship,164 and engaging directly with congressional Republicans, 
who the prime minister (correctly) believed were more receptive 
to his arguments for a tougher approach to Iran.165 
Professor Michael Ramsey noted that Netanyahu’s engage-
ment with Congress, perceived to be more aligned with Israeli 
policy than the president, echoes an incident from the Founding 
era.166 In 1793, French Ambassador Edmond Genet “sought to en-
list U.S. support for France in its conflict with Britain,” and when 
President George Washington “insisted on neutrality, Genet at-
tempted to communicate directly with Congress, which he sus-
pected was more sympathetic to France.”167 The Washington ad-
ministration, in a series of letters from Secretary of State 
Thomas Jefferson, instructed Genet to communicate only with 
the president.168 Jefferson explained, “[B]y our constitution all 
foreign agents are to be addressed to the President of the US[,] 
no other branch of the government being charged with the for-
eign communications.”169 
 
 164 See, for example, Peter Baker and Jodi Rudoren, Obama and Netanyahu: A Story 
of Slights and Crossed Signals (NY Times, Nov 9, 2015), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/politics/obama-and-netanyahu-a-story-of-slights-and-crossed 
-signals.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (chronicling tensions be-
tween Obama and Netanyahu). 
 165 See, for example, David E. Sanger, In Reprieve to Obama, Senate Democrats Agree 
to Wait on Iran Sanctions (NY Times, Jan 28, 2015), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/world/middleeast/house-hearing-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions 
.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (chronicling congressional support 
for imposing additional sanctions on Iran). 
 166 Ramsey, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (cited in note 108). 
 167 Id. 
 168 See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231, 321–22 (2001) (recounting the correspondence between 
Jefferson and Genet). For a detailed chronology of the disputes accompanying Genet’s ten-
ure as ambassador, see Curtis A. Bradley and Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power 
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich L Rev 545, 664–76 (2004). 
 169 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, US Secretary of State, to Edmond Charles Genet, 
French Ambassador to the United States (National Archives, Oct 2, 1793), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PEM7-F5AP. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, US Secretary of 
State, to Edmond Charles Genet, French Ambassador to the United States (National 
Archives, Nov 22, 1793), archived at http://perma.cc/RWT2-JVPY (deeming the president 
to be “the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations”). 
Eventually, Genet’s hijinks prompted the Washington administration to request that 
France recall him as ambassador, and some of Jefferson’s reprimands to Genet for at-
tempting to contact Congress occurred after recall was requested, but before France’s de-
cision to recall Genet reached the United States in January 1794. See Bradley and 
Flaherty, 102 Mich L Rev at 670–71, 673–74 (cited in note 168). 
644 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:609 
 
As the Genet example illustrates, forum shopping isn’t new, 
but the current era of hyperpartisanship and fractionalization 
may make it more appealing and more common. 
The Trump effect.  The Trump administration’s perceived in-
competence at and inattention to diplomacy may provide yet an-
other spur for domestic and international actors to seek one an-
other out, circumventing the executive branch.170 Missteps by 
Trump, such as failing to affirm the United States’ continued 
commitment to NATO171 and proposing deep cuts to the State 
Department’s budget,172 have provoked congressional pushback.173 
And in at least one instance, a legislator has stepped in directly 
to countermand Trump. In a February phone call, “President 
Trump blasted Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull over 
a refugee agreement and boasted about the magnitude of his elec-
toral college win” before “abruptly end[ing]” the call.174 In an at-
tempt to smooth things over, Senator McCain called Australia’s 
ambassador to the United States to “express [ ] unwavering sup-
port for the U.S.-Australia alliance.”175 
 
 170 See, for example, Morgan Chalfant, Worries Mount about Vacancies in Trump’s 
State Department (The Hill, May 21, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/D7H4-5AQV (dis-
cussing how the lack of political appointees signals that diplomacy and US alliances are 
not a priority for the Trump administration); Eliana Johnson and Michael Crowley, The 
Bottleneck in Rex Tillerson’s State Department (Politico, June 4, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XMK2-XC4Y (discussing ongoing State Department vacancies at the political-
appointee level). 
 171 See Michael D. Shear, Mark Landler, and James Kanter, In NATO Speech, Trump 
Is Vague about Mutual Defense Pledge (NY Times, May 25, 2017), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/europe/donald-trump-eu-nato.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) 
(Perma archive unavailable) (noting that at his first NATO summit, Trump “declin[ed] to 
explicitly endorse NATO’s mutual defense pledge” and instead “lash[ed] out at fellow 
members for what he called their ‘chronic underpayments’ to the alliance”). 
 172 See Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department 
Budget Cuts (Wash Post, June 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8B86-JN9T (report-
ing that Trump’s budget proposed cutting the State Department’s budget by roughly 30 
percent). 
 173 See, for example, The Latest: Senate Jabs Trump in Unanimous Vote on NATO 
(Boston Herald, June 15, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7S7D-ZUUD (reporting that 
the Senate voted unanimously in favor of a resolution reaffirming NATO’s mutual defense 
commitment); Morello and Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department Budget 
Cuts (cited in note 172) (reporting on bipartisan criticism of the Trump administration’s 
proposed State Department budget cuts, including Republican Senator Lindsey Graham’s 
statement that the proposed cuts are “radical and reckless when it comes to soft power”). 
 174 Miller and Rucker, ‘This Was the Worst Call by Far’ (cited in note 4). 
 175 Statement by SASC Chairman John McCain (cited in note 4). See also Peter 
Baker, Emmarie Huetteman, and Glenn Thrush, McCain Steps In to Ease Tension with 
Australia over Trump Insult (NY Times, Feb 2, 2017), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/us/politics/trump-congress-tax-code.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) 
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If the Trump administration continues its combination of diplo-
matic gaffes and lack of engagement through normal State 
Department channels, more congressmen may engage in direct com-
munications with foreign governments, and foreign governments 
may increasingly seek out interlocutors among the legislators.176 
The likelihood that nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations 
will become more frequent makes development of a legal frame-
work to assess its constitutionality all the more crucial. The next 
Part takes up that task. 
III.  THE CONVERSE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK 
While the traditional Youngstown framework provides guid-
ance on how to assess presidential and executive-branch actions, 
it does not address the increasingly frequent circumstances in 
which the president is cast in a reactive role.177 The converse 
Youngstown framework proposed here addresses precisely those 
situations in which Congress or the courts are the initial actors 
and the executive branch reacts to their initiative. The two 
Youngstown frameworks are not mutually exclusive. Many 
separation-of-powers disputes are iterative processes wherein, for 
example, the president takes an action, Congress reacts, then the 
president reacts to Congress’s reaction, and so on. Which frame-
work applies depends on which branch’s action is at issue. Tradi-
tional Youngstown applies when the action at issue is the execu-
tive’s; converse Youngstown applies when the action at issue is 
Congress’s or the judiciary’s. 
Many of the situations to which converse Youngstown will ap-
ply, like many instances in which traditional Youngstown applies, 
will be nonjusticiable and not ultimately resolved or resolvable by 
courts.178 The converse Youngstown framework can nonetheless 
 
(Perma archive unavailable) (reporting on McCain’s “remarkable statement” recounting 
his call). 
 176 See, for example, Jennifer Steinhauer, World Leaders Wary of Trump May Have 
an Unlikely Ally: Congress (NY Times, June 20, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/world-leaders-wary-of-trump-may-have-an-ally-congress.html 
(visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (detailing numerous actions by Congress 
to resist the Trump administration’s foreign policy positions). 
 177 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1) (noting that “[t]he Jackson for-
mula was written from the President’s perspective,” and raising the possibility of “a par-
allel formulation [that] might address the powers of Congress in relation to those of the 
President, and might be somewhat different”). 
 178 See notes 44–45 and accompanying text. Some circumstances in which converse 
Youngstown would apply might in fact be justiciable. For example, imagine a scenario in 
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help to guide analysis of separation-of-powers disputes by govern-
ment officials, such as OLC179 and legislators,180 who are on the 
front lines of such debates.181 It will also be useful to scholars fo-
cused on the respective powers of the three branches. 
The frequent absence of courts as authoritative adjudica-
tors of separation-of-powers disputes does not diminish the 
constitutional-law nature of such questions. Although “there is a 
strand of British (and, more generally, Commonwealth) constitu-
tional thinking that would limit the term ‘constitutional law’ to 
norms that are enforceable by the judiciary,” such a limitation 
“does not map well onto U.S. constitutional understandings” and 
constitutional-law scholarship.182 Rather, in the United States, 
extrajudicial constitutional decisionmaking by the political 
branches is accepted and frequent.183 
Moreover, judicial decisions remain relevant even for non-
justiciable constitutional questions. When either Youngstown or 
 
which Congress overrides a presidential veto founded on constitutional objections by en-
acting a statute that conveys rights for or imposes burdens on private parties, who would 
then have standing to sue. 
 179 See, for example, Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial 
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 L & Contemp Probs 105, 113–
14 (Summer 2004) (arguing that “the political branches do engage in principled constitu-
tional interpretation,” and citing Department of Justice legal opinions as an example). See 
also notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing OLC citations to Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework). 
 180 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 27 Stan L Rev 585, 587–88 (1975) (arguing that “legislators are obligated to deter-
mine, as best they can, the constitutionality of proposed legislation” and that “[t]he mod-
ern legislative committee, staffed by lawyers and others having expertise in particular 
areas of policy and law, is competent to consider the constitutional implications of pending 
measures”). 
 181 See Johnsen, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 115 (cited in note 179) (arguing that “[t]he 
absence of judicial review . . . does not signify the absence of constitutional limits,” but 
rather that “[c]onstitutional fidelity . . . often depends on the branches’ effectiveness in 
determining their own constitutional obligations and then exercising principled self-
restraint, as well as on the branches’ substantial powers to check each other and on the 
ultimate power of the electorate”). 
 182 Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex L Rev 773, 832 
(2014). See also Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts x–xi 
(Princeton 1999) (noting that “constitutional interpretation goes on outside the courts” 
and arguing that such interpretation is in fact “law because it is not in the first instance 
either the expression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression of unfil-
tered moral judgements”). 
 183 See Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1813 (2009) (“A far greater number 
of constitutional issues [than are decided by courts] will never be heard by any court 
and are decided by nonjudicial political actors in Congress, the executive branch, and 
state governments.”). 
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converse Youngstown apply in nonjusticiable circumstances, 
those applying the frameworks can benefit from courts’ applica-
tion of Youngstown in prior cases that did raise justiciable ques-
tions. Youngstown cases can illuminate later converse 
Youngstown situations by, for example, construing the powers of 
multiple branches in a way that can be used in later outside-the-
courts analyses, holding that certain powers are exclusive to one 
branch and thus perhaps determinative in later assessments, or 
providing methodological guidance on issues like the relevance of 
historical gloss. Thus, converse Youngstown analysis can benefit 
from the penumbras of judicial pronouncements in much the 
same way that nonjusticiable Youngstown situations do. 
Part III.A develops the converse Youngstown framework. 
Part III.B then argues that the converse Youngstown framework 
provides significant benefits over the current ad hoc approach to 
analyzing nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations and avoids 
some of the pitfalls that critics have identified with the traditional 
Youngstown framework. 
A. Converse Youngstown for Nonexecutive Foreign Relations 
Youngstown and converse Youngstown share the same basic 
goal of guiding determination of the relative constitutional pow-
ers of competing branches. Both frameworks are triggered by ex-
plicit or implicit claims of power over an issue by more than one 
branch of the federal government. To put it another way, both 
Youngstown and converse Youngstown depend on at least two 
branches of the federal government claiming constitutional au-
thority over a particular issue. Once this circumstance is identi-
fied, the choice of the Youngstown framework versus the converse 
Youngstown framework depends on which branch’s action is at 
issue. If the president’s action is at issue, Youngstown applies; if 
the actions of Congress or the courts are at issue, then converse 
Youngstown applies. 
The converse Youngstown framework focuses on the presi-
dent’s position vis-à-vis acts of Congress or the courts. In tradi-
tional Youngstown analysis, the president is the actor, and Cate-
gories 1 to 3 are defined by Congress’s position—authorization, 
silence, and opposition, respectively. Converse Youngstown flips 
the actor and reactor roles. 
A situation falls within converse Youngstown Category 1 
when Congress or the courts take an action that is authorized by, 
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coordinated with, or mediated through the executive. For non-
executive conduct of foreign relations, Category 1 involves in-
stances in which Congress or the courts engage foreign govern-
ments in direct communication that the US executive branch 
explicitly or implicitly approves. 
A quintessential example of Category 1 as applied to non-
executive conduct of foreign relations is the routine interactions 
between congressmen and foreign governments when congress-
men travel abroad on congressional delegations (or “codels”). Such 
official trips are coordinated with the State Department, which 
provides in-country embassy support to visiting lawmakers, and 
they also often involve the Defense Department, which may pro-
vide military transportation for lawmakers.184 By these actions 
(and absent any other expressed disapproval of the trip), the ex-
ecutive can be understood either to tacitly consent to the legisla-
tors’ activities or to retain some control over their actions. 
Another example of converse Youngstown Category 1 is typi-
cal invitations for foreign leaders to address Congress. Beginning 
with King Kalākaua of Hawaii in 1874, more than one hundred 
foreign leaders or dignitaries have addressed Congress.185 Usually 
invitations for foreign leaders to address Congress are coordi-
nated with the executive branch,186 with the executive explicitly 
or at least tacitly by its coordination actions approving of the in-
vitations. The 2015 invitation to Benjamin Netanyahu was anom-
alous precisely because it was not coordinated with or approved 
by the White House. 
 
 184 See, for example, Department of Defense, Directive No 4515.12: DoD Support for 
Travel of Members and Employees of Congress *1–2 (Jan 15, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KHW4-FCSG (discussing the Defense Department’s support for congres-
sional travel); Bureau of Legislative Affairs (US Department of State), archived at 
http://perma.cc/46ZN-SGMY (noting that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs “facilitates 
Congressional travel to overseas posts for Members and staff ” ); Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev 
at 339–40 (cited in note 10) (discussing State Department and Defense Department roles 
in supporting congressional travel abroad). 
 185 Joint Meeting & Joint Session Addresses (cited in note 94). 
 186 See, for example, Jacob R. Straus, CRS Insights: Foreign Heads of State 
Addressing Congress *1 (Federation of American Scientists, Feb 27, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8H93-RJ2P (“[S]ome form of consultation protocol may exist between the 
executive and legislative branch when foreign leaders visit the United States on official 
duties and the leader will be invited to speak to Congress. However, no such procedure is 
codified in law or in House or Senate Rules.”). See also Nakamura, Sullivan, and 
Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in note 95) (calling the Netanyahu in-
vitation “a departure from normal procedure” because it was not coordinated with the ex-
ecutive branch); Visits (US Department of State), archived at http://perma.cc/9N9A-PQ76 
(explaining that the State Department’s Office of the Chief of Protocol “plans, arranges 
and executes detailed programs for visiting Chiefs of State and Heads of Government”). 
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Categories 2 and 3 of converse Youngstown similarly parallel 
their regular Youngstown counterparts. In converse Youngstown 
Category 2, Congress or the courts engage in direct communica-
tions with a foreign government and the president remains silent, 
neither approving nor disapproving the action. In converse 
Youngstown Category 3, Congress or the courts engage in direct 
communications with a foreign government, and the executive 
branch actively opposes or denounces the nonexecutive branch’s 
action.187 The next Section explores in detail examples of Cate-
gory 2 and Category 3 and the constitutional questions they raise. 
B. Benefits of the Converse Youngstown Framework 
The converse Youngstown framework provides several ad-
vantages over the current ad hoc methods of analyzing instances 
of congressional and judicial involvement in foreign relations,188 
and it is less susceptible to some of the criticisms lodged against 
the traditional Youngstown framework. 
1. Captures and encourages initiative. 
The converse Youngstown framework captures the reality 
that the scrappiness often attributed to the executive in areas of 
shared power is not exclusive to that branch. Professor Louis 
Henkin explained that “[c]oncurrent power often begets a race for 
initiative and the President will usually ‘get there first.’”189 But 
usually is not always, and as the examples in Part II.A show, 
sometimes Congress or the judiciary “gets there first.” 
In Youngstown itself, Justice Jackson worried that 
Congress’s power would be overwhelmed by executive initiative. 
He explained that he had “no illusion that any decision by this 
Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise 
 
 187 The utility of the converse Youngstown framework is not limited to instances of 
nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations. For examples of additional situations in which 
the converse Youngstown framework could be deployed, see notes 282–84 and accompany-
ing text. 
 188 Consider Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework (JOTWELL, Oct 24, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/R56T-Z386 (arguing that Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence “supplied a capacious-but-coordinating legal framework that allows various 
judges on various occasions to express the major competing concerns about the relation-
ship between legislative and executive power” and that “it has the great virtue of giving 
[judges] a conceptual structure within which to speak to one another and disagree with 
each other”). 
 189 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1). 
650 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:609 
 
and timely in meeting its problems.”190 He warned that “there was 
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘[t]he 
tools belong to the man who can use them,’”191 suggesting that the 
executive would usually seize and use shared powers. But 
Congress and the judiciary have proven capable of seizing and 
using tools at their disposal to assert power in foreign relations.192 
The converse Youngstown framework mandates the identifi-
cation of constitutional powers (if any) at issue for each branch 
and weighs competing powers against one another, rather than 
simply looking to the executive branch powers in play. The addi-
tion of converse Youngstown to the Youngstown landscape en-
sures that there is a framework for analyzing assertions of power, 
regardless of which branch is using the tools at its disposal. 
In addition, the converse Youngstown framework may actu-
ally encourage the nonexecutive branches to take the initiative 
more often. By mandating consideration of any constitutional 
powers implicated by the nonexecutive branches’ actions, the 
framework incentivizes those branches to make constitutional ar-
guments. Of course, the executive may object to congressional or 
judicial actions, but that’s just the start, not the end, of the con-
stitutional analysis for a converse Youngstown Category 3 case. 
Assertion of constitutional authority can play an offensive role in 
asserting legislative or judicial prerogatives, but also a defensive 
role, blocking executive claims that the nonexecutive branches 
have acquiesced in executive dominance over particular issues. 
Moreover, even if one president objects to an instance of non-
executive initiative, such an aberrational (in the sense of out of 
line with past presidents) objection may be insufficient to trigger 
converse Youngstown Category 3. Analyses of both historical 
gloss and acquiescence make related points. As Justice 
Frankfurter explained in Youngstown, historical gloss on the sep-
aration of powers comes from “systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
 
 190 Youngstown, 343 US at 654 (Jackson concurring). 
 191 Id (Jackson concurring). 
 192 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky v Clinton, Docket No 10-699, *10 (US 
Nov 7, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 7005874) (reflecting Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s description of the “usual inter-branch hand wrestling” in which Congress “has an 
innumerable number of clubs with which to beat the executive”); Bradley and Morrison, 
126 Harv L Rev at 457 (cited in note 48) (discussing Jackson’s quotation of Napoleon and 
noting that the “observation is generalizable to the preservation of executive as well as 
legislative power”). 
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before questioned.”193 When an executive objection to a congres-
sional or judicial practice is instead unsystematic and illustrative 
of a break with past practice, perhaps the aberrant objection 
should be disregarded, keeping the nonexecutive branch in con-
verse Youngstown Category 2. 
Similarly, in assessing how to evaluate one branch’s non-
objection to another’s actions, scholars have argued that acquies-
cence cannot be inferred from a single instance of nonobjection 
because “[o]therwise, the outlier decisions of a single administra-
tion could change the constitutional order.”194 Just so. Therefore, 
if many presidents have explicitly or impliedly approved of a type 
of nonexecutive foreign relations, then one president’s opposition 
may be insufficient to move the conduct into Category 3. Aberrant 
executive objections—especially ones that do not appear to be 
based on rigorous analysis—should not be sufficient to disrupt 
prior executive acquiescence to congressional or judicial practice. 
For all of these reasons, the converse Youngstown framework 
both captures the initiative that Congress and the judiciary may 
exercise and incentivizes them to undertake additional actions.195 
 
 193 Youngstown, 343 US at 610 (Frankfurter concurring). See also 18 Op Off Legal 
Counsel at 178 (cited in note 43) (“[A] pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of 
right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences 
the existence of a broad constitutional power.’”), quoting Office of Legal Counsel, 
Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad without Statutory Authorization, 4A 
Op Off Legal Counsel 185, 187 (Feb 12, 1980). 
 194 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 48). 
 195 A similar argument may apply to state initiatives with respect to foreign relations, 
which are becoming increasingly frequent in the Trump era. Although the primary legal 
framework for assessing the permissibility of states’ actions is preemption, the Supreme 
Court in preemption cases has considered the extent to which the federal government is 
unified or divided over the potentially preemptive federal policy or action. For example, in 
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000), the Court relied on the fact 
that the president was acting in Youngstown Category 1—with Congress’s approval—in 
imposing sanctions on Burma as a reason to find that stricter Massachusetts sanctions 
were obstacle preempted. Id at 375–77. In other words, the fact that Congress and the 
president agreed caused the Court to increase the scope of federal preemption vis-à-vis the 
states. Similar reasoning may apply to Category 3 cases in either the classic Youngstown 
or converse Youngstown frameworks: if Congress and the president disagree, courts may 
use the disagreement as a justification for finding a narrower scope for federal preemption, 
leaving states with more freedom to act. This possibility is a reason for Congress to disa-
gree with President Trump—and to do so vocally—on issues like withdrawal from the 
Paris Climate Agreement. See, for example, Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. 
from Paris Climate Agreement (NY Times, June 1, 2017), online at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html (visited Feb 7, 
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Even if Congress’s opposition does not stop the presi-
dential action, it might have the more indirect effect of shrinking the preemptive scope of 
federal power to allow state initiatives to proceed. See, for example, Hiroko Tabuchi and 
Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States, and Companies Commit to Paris 
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2. Decreases indeterminacy. 
The converse Youngstown framework avoids some of the pit-
falls that critics observe in the traditional Youngstown frame-
work. In particular, converse Youngstown decreases, though does 
not eliminate, the indeterminacy that dogs traditional 
Youngstown analysis. 
Critics have assailed Youngstown for being indeterminate on 
at least two dimensions.196 Professor Tribe recently highlighted 
indeterminacy in Youngstown Category 2, calling “the nearly sac-
rosanct triptych [ ] deeply ambiguous on the key question of what 
to make of congressional silence.”197 Tribe argues that 
Youngstown fails to provide a 
normative framework for deciding: (1) which kinds of presi-
dential action in the relevant sphere are void unless plainly 
authorized by Congress ex ante; (2) which are valid unless 
plainly prohibited by Congress ex ante; and (3) which are of 
uncertain validity when Congress has been essentially “si-
lent” on the matter although dropping hints about its sup-
posed “will.”198 
The converse Youngstown framework is less susceptible to in-
determinacy in Category 2. The differences between Youngstown 
and converse Youngstown on this score stem from the differing 
institutional features of the counterparty branch in each frame-
work. In traditional Youngstown, the executive acts, and then the 
question is what position, if any, has Congress (the counterparty) 
taken. Very often Congress is silent, and that silence may be at-
tributable to a variety of factors. Congressional silence may indi-
cate congressional acquiescence in the executive’s claim of 
 
Accord (NY Times, June 1, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/ 
climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive una-
vailable). I plan to explore further the federalism implications of Youngstown and converse 
Youngstown in future work. 
 196 Henkin adds perhaps a third type of indeterminacy critique in arguing that 
“Justice Jackson did not tell us, or offer a principle that might help us determine, which 
powers are concurrent.” Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1). This argument 
may demand unnecessary work from the Youngstown framework. The question of which 
powers are concurrent can be answered by looking to constitutional text, historical prac-
tice, or the claims of competing branches. The Youngstown framework is needed to help 
adjudicate competing claims to power, not to identify such competing claims in the first 
instance. 
 197 Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional 
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 Yale L J F 86, 91 (2016). 
 198 Id at 92. 
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power.199 But structural features of the legislative branch, rather 
than considered congressional agreement with the executive, may 
often explain congressional silence.200 “Structural [i]mpediments 
to [c]ongressional [a]ction,” including voting rules and veto gates, 
make it difficult for Congress to pass legislation to counter exec-
utive initiative.201 Moreover, collective-action problems limit the 
incentives for individual congressmen to act to protect the pre-
rogatives of the institution because the benefits of such action in-
ure to Congress as a whole, rather than to the individual legisla-
tor.202 These features do not suggest that Congress is impotent 
to check claims of executive power,203 just that Congress often 
will not formally act to approve or disapprove of executive ac-
tion. Congressional failure to act—whether out of agreement or 
inertia—causes cases of contested power to be in the indetermi-
nate Category 2. 
 
 199 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (“When the President acts and 
Congress is silent, there is often a justifiable presumption that Congress has acquiesced 
in, even approved, what the President has done; if so, the action can be seen as supported 
by the constitutional powers of both branches.”); Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev 
at 433–36 (cited in note 48) (distinguishing between acquiescence as implicit agreement 
by Congress to the executive claim and acquiescence as waiver of Congress’s powers). 
 200 See Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral 
Action, 15 J L, Econ & Org 132, 140 (1999) (“Congress is burdened by collective action 
problems and heavy transaction costs that make it extremely difficult for that institution 
to fashion a timely, coherent response to presidential action, or even to respond at all.”). 
 201 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 440 (cited in note 48). 
 202 See, for example, id (noting that “[b]ecause Congress is a plural body,” all members 
of Congress “benefit from the protection and enhancement of legislative authority even if 
some of them do not contribute to the effort,” and therefore that “each individual member 
has relatively little incentive to expend resources trying to increase or defend congres-
sional power, since he or she will not be able to capture most of the gains”); Moe and 
Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 144 (cited in note 200) (explaining that congressmen, each 
motivated to secure their own reelection, “are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might 
benefit if they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each has 
a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency”). 
 203 For example, Congress has less formal tools, such as “oversight hearings, non-
binding resolutions, the threat of contempt proceedings, and public disclosure of infor-
mation,” which “are not subject to the collective action problems that beset the formal 
legislative process.” Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 446 (cited in note 48). 
Professors Bradley and Morrison argue that these less formal options for expressing con-
gressional disapproval of executive action should be taken into account in Youngstown 
analysis and that doing so would reduce the number of cases in which interpreters try to 
draw meaning from silence. Id at 451 (“[I]nclud[ing] a wider array of congressional re-
sponses to executive action will substantially shrink the universe of cases where Congress 
can truly be said to have remained silent, which will in turn shrink the number of cases 
drawing inferences from such silence. That is all to the good.”). 
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The converse Youngstown framework is less susceptible to 
this concern because it posits that the governmental actor is ei-
ther Congress or the courts, which thereby casts the executive in 
the role of counterparty. The executive is very differently struc-
tured and incentivized than Congress.204 The executive, by design, 
is comparatively more nimble than Congress and can act 
quickly.205 The unitary nature of the executive ensures that it does 
not suffer from the same collective-action problems that restrain 
congressional action and that the executive captures the bene-
fits of expending capital on protecting the branch’s institutional 
prerogatives, making it more likely to do so.206 These features 
mean that the executive is much more likely than Congress to 
(re)act when its powers are challenged.207 In converse 
Youngstown situations, executive silence will be rare,208 which 
means far fewer Category 2 cases than traditional Youngstown 
and thus less indeterminacy.209 
Converse Youngstown not only decreases indeterminacy by 
limiting the number of Category 2 cases; it also clarifies the im-
port of those Category 2 cases that do occur. As noted above, 
 
 204 See id at 439–40 (“Congress and the President are not equally situated in their 
ability to take action.”). 
 205 See, for example, Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 200 (NYU 
2d ed 1941) (noting that in the “struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy . . . the President has . . . certain great advantages,” including “the unity of the of-
fice, its capacity for secrecy and despatch,” and “the fact that it is always on hand and 
ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much of the time”). 
 206 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 452 (cited in note 48) (“The executive 
branch faces fewer collective action and veto obstacles than does Congress, and thus it is 
easier for the President and those serving under him to take legally consequential steps 
to protect executive prerogatives.”); Moe and Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 144–45 (cited 
in note 200) (explaining that “Presidents are not hobbled by” the collective-action problems 
that plague Congress and that “not only is the presidency a unitary institution with the 
capacity for coherent action, but there is also substantial congruence between the presi-
dent’s individual interests and the interests of the institution”). 
 207 See Moe and Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 145 (cited in note 200) (noting a “fun-
damental imbalance” in which “Presidents have both the will and the capacity to promote 
the power of their own institution, but individual legislators have neither and cannot be 
expected to promote the power of Congress as a whole in any coherent, forceful way”). 
 208 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (“A President is less likely to remain 
silent when Congress acts in what he considers his domain.”). 
 209 Category 2 cases are, of course, still possible. The “Dear Comandante” letter may 
be an example. The Reagan administration apparently offered no official statement for 
more than a year, at which point the secretary of state condemned the letter before repu-
diating the criticism later the same day. See notes 147–53 and accompanying text. See 
also notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing the routine filings by foreign sover-
eigns as parties in cases before US courts—filings that do not typically occasion endorse-
ment or objection by the executive). 
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traditional Youngstown Category 2 cases involve congressional si-
lence, and “assigning interpretive consequences to congressional 
silence or inaction is perilous at best” because congressional si-
lence may indicate agreement or simply reflect inertia.210 In con-
verse Youngstown Category 2, the silence is executive, not con-
gressional, and executive silence is arguably more meaningful. 
Because the executive does not have the structural impedi-
ments to action and collective-action problems that Congress 
does, inertia is less likely to be the cause of executive silence. 
In other words, because it is so (comparatively) easy for the ex-
ecutive to speak and to disapprove the actions of the other 
branches,211 executive silence is more likely to indicate mean-
ingful agreement with (or at least nonobjection to) the acting 
branch’s claim of authority.212 Understanding executive silence 
in converse Youngstown as more communicative than congres-
sional silence in traditional Youngstown further limits indeter-
minacy in Category 2. 
Although converse Youngstown mitigates the Category 2 in-
determinacy critique, that’s not the only indeterminacy problem 
with Youngstown. Commentators have raised a separate critique 
of indeterminacy in Category 3 cases, when the president acts in 
opposition to the expressed will of Congress. Henkin noted that 
in Category 3, “Jackson[’s] ‘arithmetic’” does not “suggest which 
 
 210 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 451 (cited in note 48). 
 211 To object to legislation, for example, the president may exercise the veto, express 
concerns in a signing statement, or “publicly refus[e] to enforce or comply with the stat-
ute,” and “[p]residential administrations regularly avail themselves of one or more of these 
means, on the understanding that failure to do so could be taken as acquiescence.” Id at 
452–53 (cited in note 48). The president can also object to nonlegislative congressional or 
judicial actions in other ways, such as in public statements. See, for example, Michael J. 
Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 BU L Rev 
109, 140 (1984) (arguing that the president can object to congressional actions through 
“[p]ress releases, statements made upon signing or vetoing of a bill, [ ] statements made 
during a press conference,” or statements by other executive officials that are attributable 
to the president). 
 212 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (arguing that while executive 
silence is less likely than congressional silence, a president’s “failure to veto Congressional 
legislation or to protest other Congressional initiatives might also imply acquiescence and 
mute any objection that Congress lacks constitutional authority”); Bradley and Morrison, 
126 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 48) (arguing that “[e]xecutive silence . . . should gen-
erally carry greater weight than congressional silence” because executive-branch actors 
can easily object and they “understand that failure to object to legislative limits on execu-
tive authority may be treated as accepting their constitutionality”). 
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branch prevails in case of conflict between them.”213 A fairer de-
scription might be that Jackson does suggest, but does not settle, 
which branch should prevail in Category 3. 
Prior to Zivotofsky II, Category 3 was understood to include 
a strong presumption that the president loses, something akin to 
the maxim that in other constitutional contexts “strict scrutiny” 
is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”214 Category 3 might have 
been glossed as presumption in theory, fatal in fact.215 But that 
changed in Zivotofsky II when, for the first time, the Supreme 
Court upheld a presidential action in foreign relations that con-
travened a statute.216 Prior to the Court’s decision, Category 3 in-
determinacy was more hypothetical than actual. But 
Zivotofsky II’s holding brings to the fore the Category 3 indeter-
minacy inherent in the original Youngstown framework.217 
Converse Youngstown largely mirrors the Category 3 inde-
terminacy issue from Youngstown. In the foreign relations con-
text and in the wake of Zivotofsky II, however, Category 3 in con-
verse Youngstown may be slightly less indeterminate. Converse 
Youngstown Category 3 does not arithmetically resolve which 
branch should prevail, but like Youngstown, it implies a presump-
tion that the acting branch—Congress or the courts—will lose 
when faced with opposition from the counterparty (the executive). 
Category 3 in both frameworks at least starts with a presump-
tion, making it more determinate than Category 2, which in clas-
sic Youngstown puts no thumb on the scale for either branch. 
 
 213 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1). 
 214 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 
(1972). See also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand L Rev 793, 794–95 (2006) (noting that 
Professor Gerald Gunther coined the phrase). 
 215 See Swaine, 83 S Cal L Rev at 311 (cited in note 18) (calling Category 3 “practically 
a death knell for executive branch action”). 
 216 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2113 (Roberts dissenting) (“For our first 225 years, 
no President prevailed when contradicting a statute in the field of foreign affairs.”); id at 
2116 (Roberts dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s ruling for the president “takes the 
perilous step—for the first time in our history—of allowing the President to defy an Act of 
Congress in the field of foreign affairs”). 
 217 This indeterminacy bespeaks yet another similarity to the strict scrutiny frame-
work: despite the popularity of the “fatal in fact” label, Professor Adam Winkler has shown 
that in practice “strict scrutiny is survivable in fact,” with “30 percent of all applications 
of strict scrutiny . . . result[ing] in the challenged law being upheld.” Winkler, 59 Vand L 
Rev at 796 (cited in note 214). Just so with presidential actions in Category 3, per 
Zivotofsky II. 
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In some cases, however, the presumption of congressional or 
judicial loss in converse Youngstown Category 3 cases may be 
somewhat stronger than the presumption of executive loss in clas-
sic Youngstown Category 3. In converse Youngstown Category 3, 
the presumptive winner is the executive, whose power over recog-
nition decisions the Supreme Court recognized to be exclusive in 
Zivotofsky II.218 For nonexecutive foreign relations scenarios in 
which the executive power at issue is recognition, therefore, it will 
be difficult for Congress or the courts (the presumptive losers) to 
overcome the presumption that the executive should prevail. In 
other words, converse Youngstown does not solve the Category 3 
indeterminacy problem, but for certain foreign relations cases, it 
does align the presumption about which branch prevails with the 
executive, who the Supreme Court has held has at least one ex-
clusive power related to foreign relations. 
3. Simplifies constitutional analysis. 
By taking into account the relative position of the executive 
branch as to the actions by the nonexecutive branch, the converse 
Youngstown framework simplifies the constitutional analysis. 
The simplification of the constitutional analysis is particu-
larly apparent with respect to cases in converse Youngstown Cat-
egory 1. Instead of asking whether the nonexecutive branch has 
the constitutional authority to take the action it has taken, the 
converse Youngstown framework asks whether the nonexecutive 
branch plus the executive branch (which has approved the non-
executive branch’s action) have the constitutional authority. The 
nonexecutive branch does not have to prevail based on the 
strength of its own power alone; rather, it benefits from the boost 
provided by executive approval. 
Different theories could explain the nature of the constitu-
tional boost provided by the executive’s approval. Presidential ap-
proval could be considered a delegation to the nonexecutive 
branch,219 such that congressional or judicial communications to 
 
 218 See note 35 and accompanying text. 
 219 In the traditional Youngstown context, Jackson described Category 1 as involving 
a congressional delegation to the president. See Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson con-
curring) (arguing that in Category 1, the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate”). 
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foreign governments would effectively represent exercises of del-
egated executive power.220 Alternatively, executive approval may 
suggest that preexisting congressional or judicial power should be 
construed broadly. Presidential endorsement demonstrates that 
the nonexecutive branch’s actions are helpful to or desired by the 
executive, and thus that any concern about the nonexecutive 
branches’ infringement on executive power would be misplaced, 
opening the door to reading whatever power the nonexecutive 
branch possesses to its outer limits. 
Regardless of the precise explanation, long-standing practice 
supports the executive effectively deputizing members of the 
other branches.221 “[T]hroughout American history,” members of 
Congress “have served as members of or advisers to the U.S. del-
egation negotiating a treaty.”222 For example, President William 
McKinley “appointed three Senators to a commission to negotiate 
a treaty with Spain” in 1898,223 and fully half of the members of 
the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference to negotiate 
the UN Charter were sitting members of Congress.224 The execu-
tive’s occasional decision to include congressmen in treaty negoti-
ations is “now common and no longer challenged.”225 The same 
logic can justify, for example, senators’ and representatives’ more 
ad hoc interactions with foreign officials while traveling abroad. 
 
 220 See, for example, Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 377 (cited in note 10) (arguing that 
Article II “empowers the president to delegate executive power to members of the House 
and Senate so that they can act on his behalf”). 
 221 For examples from the judiciary, see id at 379 (arguing that “official practice 
strongly suggests that horizontal executive delegation is permissible” and providing ex-
amples of presidents tasking Supreme Court justices to foreign relations–related activi-
ties, such as Jackson’s service as the chief US prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials). For 
congressional examples, see notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
 222 Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate, 
S Prt No 106-71, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 109 (2001). 
 223 Id. 
 224 See id at 109–10 (detailing this and numerous other examples). See also Louis 
Fisher, “The Law”: Treaty Negotiation; A Presidential Monopoly?, 38 Pres Stud Q 144, 
151–52 (2008) (recounting numerous examples of congressmen serving as members of or 
advisers to treaty-negotiating delegations). 
 225 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 178 (cited in note 1). See also id at 82 & n * (cited in 
note 1) (noting that appointing congressmen to delegations to international conferences 
“no longer raises constitutional questions under Art. 1, sec. 6, cl. 2”). This is so despite 
earlier questions about the practice’s conformity with the Constitution’s Incompatibility 
Clause. See US Const Art I, § 6, cl 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). See also 
Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 178 & n ** (cited in note 1) (detailing earlier examples of 
Incompatibility Clause controversies). 
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Accounting for the confluence of the executive and 
nonexecutive branches’ authority allows adjudicators of the con-
stitutional question, whether legislators, judges, or executive of-
ficials, to engage in constitutional avoidance. As the Supreme 
Court has explained, “If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted 
than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is 
that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . un-
less such adjudication is unavoidable.”226 Converse Youngstown 
renders some constitutional adjudications avoidable for Cate-
gory 1 cases. In particular, the converse Youngstown frame-
work makes it unnecessary to decide the precise scope of the 
nonexecutive branch’s power so long as the executive’s power 
alone or a broad understanding of the nonexecutive branch’s 
power is sufficient to surpass the constitutional threshold. 
Take, for example, routine invitations for foreign leaders to 
address Congress. These invitations are typically done with the 
approval of and in coordination with the executive branch. For 
such coordinated invitations, the constitutional analysis is sim-
ple: assuming the president’s power to receive ambassadors co-
vers inviting a foreign leader to come to the United States, and 
Congress agrees to hear the leader’s remarks, then there is no 
need to assess the magnitude of Congress’s independent power to 
invite and hear from a foreign leader or to do so over the objec-
tions of the executive branch. 
A similar analysis applies for routine congressional travel 
abroad. The executive branch approves explicitly, or at least im-
plicitly, the legislators’ travel by providing transportation, coor-
dinating meetings, and supplying other types of support.227 So 
long as the executive branch’s power alone provides sufficient con-
stitutional justification for having US citizens meet with foreign 
government representatives, there is no need to determine what 
(if any) independent power Congress has to conduct the activities. 
Consider also the Supreme Court’s instigation of the shift 
from foreign sovereigns filing diplomatic notes to filing amicus 
briefs. This is a Category 1 case because the executive agreed to 
 
 226 Spector Motor Service, Inc v McLaughlin, 323 US 101, 105 (1944). See also 
Department of Commerce v United States House of Representatives, 525 US 316, 343–44 
(1999) (declining to reach the constitutional question presented due to the doctrine of con-
stitutional avoidance); Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 77–81 (West 7th ed 2015) (discussing constitutional avoidance). 
 227 See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 339–40 (cited in note 10) (discussing executive-
branch support for congressional travel to foreign countries). See also note 184 and accom-
panying text. 
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the Supreme Court’s determination that foreign sovereign views 
should no longer be communicated via diplomatic notes.228 The ex-
ecutive chose how to respond to the letter from the Supreme Court 
clerk indicating that the diplomatic-note practice was contrary to 
the Court’s rules, and in acceding to the Court’s letter, the execu-
tive actually went beyond the letter, declaring that not only would 
it cease transmitting diplomatic notes to the Supreme Court, but 
it would also cease transmitting them to courts of appeals and 
eventually district courts as well.229 Because the Court and the 
executive agreed, so long as the executive’s power to communicate 
with foreign governments, considered in isolation, is sufficient to 
support the shift from diplomatic notes to amicus briefs, there is 
no need to determine whether the Supreme Court would have had 
independent constitutional authority to effectuate the shift. 
As these examples illustrate, by situating the nonexecutive 
foreign relations analysis within a framework that explicitly ac-
counts for the combined power of the executive and nonexecutive 
branches, the converse Youngstown analysis allows adjudicators, 
in the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, to avoid “anticipat[ing] a 
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of de-
ciding it.”230 Nailing down the independent powers of each branch 
is necessary for Category 2 and 3 cases, but not for Category 1 
cases. Converse Youngstown thereby helps to explain why easy 
cases are easy and to make some cases easier by rendering some 
constitutional holdings avoidable.231 
Before turning to Category 3 cases, an important caveat is 
worth highlighting. The discussion of converse Category 1 cases 
does not imply that if Congress or the courts receive executive 
 
 228 See notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 229 See notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 230 Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis 
concurring). See also Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts at 77 (cited in 
note 226) (calling Brandeis’s concurrence the “nearly canonical citation for the avoidance 
doctrine”). 
 231 It is perhaps useful to note that the converse Youngstown framework would not 
prohibit adjudicators from assessing the power of each branch; it merely means that they 
do not have to for Category 1 cases. Providing adjudicators the discretion to address which-
ever question is easier—the power of each branch separately or the combined power of the 
branches—is consistent with, for example, the Supreme Court’s shift in qualified immun-
ity jurisprudence to give courts discretion over the ordering of determinations about 
whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the right violated was clearly 
established. See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 242 (2009) (“Our decision does not pre-
vent the lower courts from following the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that those 
courts should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure is worthwhile in par-
ticular cases.”). 
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support, they can do anything. As in traditional Youngstown Cat-
egory 1, the branches’ actions even—or perhaps especially—when 
they agree are cabined by constitutional limits, including protec-
tions for individual rights. However, in the foreign relations con-
text in which both Youngstown and converse Youngstown would 
most often be deployed, the interests at stake are typically the 
powers of coordinate branches of government, not the rights of 
individuals.232 
Although the converse Youngstown framework does not elim-
inate Category 3 indeterminacy, it nonetheless adds value by 
channeling the analysis of competing powers in circumstances in 
which the executive objects to congressional or judicial conduct of 
foreign relations. Like traditional Youngstown, converse 
Youngstown does not answer the question of how to determine 
whether there are competing powers at issue, but once claims of 
competing power are made, both frameworks provide a presump-
tive prevailing branch and thereby frame the analysis. 
In describing Category 3 in his Youngstown concurrence, 
Jackson appears to suggest two alternative—though related—
analyses. The first is an arithmetic weighing up of the competing 
powers that instructs that the president can prevail when “his 
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter” generates a positive result.233 The sec-
ond formulation instructs that “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive 
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject.”234 This second formu-
lation may simply be a special application of the arithmetical 
formula: a power of the president minus an erroneously 
claimed power of Congress results in a power of the president 
and thus a presidential win. 
The second formulation—the exclusive formulation—may be 
the one appropriate for easy Category 3 cases—that is, those in 
which Congress lacks the power it claims. This would explain the 
Supreme Court’s formulation of Category 3 in Zivotofsky II. 
There, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court ex-
plained that “[t]o succeed in this third category, the President’s 
 
 232 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 416–17 (cited in note 48) (arguing 
in the related context of assessments of historical practice that “[h]istorical practice in the 
separation of powers context is distinctive [ ] in that it generally involves conduct by one 
political branch implicating the interests and prerogatives of the other,” rather than indi-
vidual rights). 
 233 Youngstown, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring). 
 234 Id at 637–38 (Jackson concurring) (emphasis added). 
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asserted power must be both ‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the 
issue.”235 The Court went on to hold for the president—despite 
Congress’s opposition—on the ground that “Congress . . . has no 
constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic 
relations with a foreign nation.”236 In the Court’s framing, at least, 
Zivotofsky II was an easy Category 3 case: the president’s recog-
nition power was exclusive, so there was no congressional power 
to subtract. The result would have been the same, regardless of 
which verbal formulation of Category 3 the Court employed. The 
two formulations of Category 3 are not, however, interchangeable 
for “hard” Category 3 cases: those in which competing branches 
each possess some competing powers and deploy their powers in 
opposition to one another. 
For purposes of converse Youngstown, the arithmetic formu-
lation gains increased importance. Because converse Youngstown 
casts the executive in the role of counterparty, there are unlikely 
to be many easy Category 3 cases. It would be a rare case in which 
the executive would be entirely “disable[ed] . . . from acting upon 
the subject” when the subject touches on foreign relations.237 If the 
totally disabled formulation were the only understanding of Cat-
egory 3, then converse Youngstown would suggest that Congress 
or the courts would always lose Category 3 cases because the ex-
ecutive would have some power to act upon the subject. The arith-
metic formulation, however, includes greater flexibility and bet-
ter captures the likely scenario in foreign relations cases—that 
such cases will often be hard cases in which both the executive 
and the nonexecutive branch have some power. 
Zivotofsky II did not have to confront the complexities of the 
arithmetical formulation because it held that Congress had no 
power over recognition. In making this “easy” Category 3 holding, 
however, the Court provided some guidance on the antecedent 
question of the scope of executive and congressional powers in for-
eign relations. The United States argued that “the President has 
‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ along with 
‘the bulk of foreign-affairs powers,’”238 citing Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.239 The Court pointedly “decline[d] to acknowledge 
 
 235 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2084. 
 236 Id at 2086. 
 237 Youngstown, 343 US at 637–38 (Jackson concurring). 
 238 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2089, quoting Brief for Respondent, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket 
No 13-628, *16, 18 (US filed Sept 22, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4726506). 
 239 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US at 320. 
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that unbounded power”240 and instead emphasized that Congress 
retains important authorities over foreign relations: 
In a world that is ever more compressed and interdependent, 
it is essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be un-
derstood and respected. For it is Congress that makes laws, 
and in countless ways its laws will and should shape the 
Nation’s course. The Executive is not free from the ordinary 
controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign af-
fairs are at issue. It is not for the President alone to deter-
mine the whole content of the Nation’s foreign policy.241 
Zivotofsky II is at once a strong executive-power holding be-
cause the president prevailed in Category 3, but also an 
executive-power defeat because of its explicit rejection of the ex-
ecutive’s broader claim of exclusive power over foreign relations. 
For purposes of converse Youngstown analysis, although 
Zivotofsky II relied on the “totally disabled” formulation of Cate-
gory 3, the Court also suggested that outside the recognition con-
text, it remains open to claims of foreign relations power by the 
nonexecutive branches. Nonexecutive foreign relations cases, 
therefore, are likely to be “hard” Category 3 cases in which 
branches have competing claims of power, requiring an arithme-
tic resolution.242 
Although the converse Youngstown framework does not re-
solve the Category 3 indeterminacy inherent in the Youngstown 
framework, it can at least help to move beyond the mere identifi-
cation of branches’ competing claims to authority to a regularized 
analysis. Ultimately, the resolution of Category 3 cases will be 
fact specific and may often depend on one’s view of the underlying 
constitutional powers and appropriate methods of constitutional 
interpretation. On hard Category 3 cases in both Youngstown 
and converse Youngstown, reasonable minds may differ on the 
outcome. 
Three examples—two actual and one hypothetical—can help 
to illustrate the utility and limits of the converse Youngstown 
framework for Category 3 cases. The Cotton letter and the 
 
 240 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2089. 
 241 Id at 2090 (citations omitted). 
 242 See Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after 
the Iran-Contra Affair 67 (Yale 1990) (arguing that with respect to foreign affairs powers, 
the Constitution “frequently . . . grants clearly related powers to separate institutions, 
without ever specifying the relationship between those powers. . . . Most often, the text 
simply says nothing about who controls certain domains”). 
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Netanyahu invitation are Category 3 cases. In both instances, 
Congress or a meaningful subset of Congress243 engaged directly 
with foreign government officials, and the president expressly 
disapproved. The hypothetical example is a reimagining of the 
Supreme Court’s instigation of the shift from foreign governments 
filing diplomatic notes to filing amicus briefs, but one in which 
instead of going along with and expanding on the Supreme 
Court’s desire not to receive diplomatic notes, the executive 
branch disagreed and attempted to continue filing diplomatic 
notes on behalf of foreign governments. 
Taking first the Cotton letter, the converse Youngstown 
framework instructs that the first step is identification of compet-
ing constitutional powers. On the executive-branch side, two pow-
ers may be implicated. The first is the general implied power to 
conduct foreign relations, stemming from the president’s consti-
tutional authority to “receive Ambassadors and other public Min-
isters.”244 Most legal commentators who have considered the 
Cotton letter’s constitutional implications focus on potential in-
terference with this presidential power.245 A similar interference 
argument could be made with respect to the president’s power to 
“make Treaties” with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate.246 Although the Iran agreement was ultimately concluded 
as a political commitment,247 not an Article II treaty, there was 
 
 243 The inclusion of the Cotton letter as an example of nonexecutive conduct of foreign 
relations could be challenged on several grounds. First, the letter was signed by forty-
seven Republican senators and did not claim to speak for the Senate as a whole. Second, 
the letter did not purport to speak for the United States—an action that would have been 
a clear subversion of the president’s authority to conduct foreign relations. Rather, the 
letter purported simply to provide information about the US constitutional system that 
Iran “should seriously consider as negotiations progress.” Cotton, et al, Open Letter (cited 
in note 128). See also Ku, 47 US Senators Send Iran’s Leader an Unnecessary(?) Primer 
on How US Constitution Works (cited in note 143). On the other hand, as to the first point, 
the letter was signed and sent on behalf of a group of senators sufficient to block adoption 
of an agreement with Iran as either an Article II treaty or a congressional-executive agree-
ment (given the filibuster), making the group a potentially constitutionally significant 
bloc. See note 55 and accompanying text. And on the second point, the letter was appar-
ently intended to and was understood as an attempt to interfere in ongoing negotiation of 
an agreement with Iran, which suggests an intent to interfere with the president’s author-
ity to negotiate on behalf of the United States. On balance, although some might argue 
against inclusion of the Cotton letter as an example of nonexecutive conduct of foreign 
relations, the question is sufficiently close that I have included the example for purposes 
of discussion. 
 244 US Const Art II, § 3. 
 245 See notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 246 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. 
 247 Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, US 
Department of State to Representative Mike Pompeo *1 (Nov 19, 2015), archived at 
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ambiguity on the agreement’s form when the senators sent the 
Cotton letter.248 The president’s authority to “make Treaties” is 
understood to include implied authority to negotiate them,249 and 
thus the Cotton letter arguably could be understood as an inter-
ference with the president’s negotiating authority, in addition to 
interference with the president’s authority to communicate with 
foreign governments more generally. 
With the presidential authorities on one side, the congres-
sional side of the equation is more problematic. The Cotton letter 
itself does not purport to invoke any constitutional authority. The 
strongest possible argument would stem from the Senate’s role in 
advising and consenting to treaties,250 but even as to that clear 
textual power, the justification for transmitting the Cotton letter 
to a foreign government’s executive branch is not clear.251 Tradi-
tionally, the Senate’s role has not extended to involvement in ne-
gotiations,252 which are left to the president, with the Senate (or 
 
http://perma.cc/C32V-LKYK (“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a 
treaty or an executive agreement. . . . The JCPOA reflects political commitments between 
Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), 
and the European Union.”). See also Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the Obama 
Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57 Harv Intl L J 455, 465–
66 (2016) (discussing the status of the Iran deal as a political commitment). 
 248 For an overview of contemporaneous debates about the status of the Iran deal, see  
Stephen Collison, Iran Deal: A Treaty or Not a Treaty, That Is the Question (CNN, Mar 12, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/49XE-MHQ7; Carol Morello, In Iran Nuclear Talks, It’s 
All in a Name (Wash Post, Mar 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VSU9-9E9T (collect-
ing disparate views). 
 249 See, for example, Treaties and Other International Agreements at 6 (cited in note 
222) (“The first phase of treatymaking, negotiation and conclusion, is widely considered 
an exclusive prerogative of the President except for making appointments which require 
the advice and consent of the Senate.”); id at 97–98 (locating the president’s implied power 
to negotiate international agreements in the Article II, § 2 power to “make Treaties,” as 
well as the president’s powers to appoint and receive ambassadors and the Article II, § 1 
vesting clause). 
 250 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (“[The president] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”). 
 251 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 81 (cited in note 1) (drawing a constitutional dis-
tinction between sense-of-Congress resolutions about international issues and “Congres-
sional resolutions directly addressed to foreign governments,” which are “technically ob-
jectionable” because of the president’s status as the “sole organ of communication with 
foreign governments”). 
 252 See Treaties and Other International Agreements at 2–3, 27–38 (cited in note 222) 
(discussing the evolution of the Senate’s role with respect to treaty negotiation). One prom-
inent historical episode deviates from the Senate’s traditional noninvolvement prior to 
advising and consenting to a negotiated agreement. In 1789, President Washington per-
sonally went to the Senate to consult on “the terms of a treaty to be negotiated with the 
Southern Indians.” Id at 33. The consultations went so badly that they are “famous as the 
first and last times that a President personally appeared before the Senate to seek its 
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Congress as a whole in the case of congressional-executive agree-
ments) weighing in on a proposed treaty text after it has been 
negotiated.253 Alternatively, the senators might have argued that 
they were seeking to protect the Senate’s interest in ensuring that 
the Iran agreement was concluded as an Article II treaty so that 
the Senate would have the opportunity to advise and consent (or 
not) to the deal. Assuming such a penumbral power exists, there 
may be permissible and impermissible ways to exercise it. Such 
an argument, for example, could support sending something like 
the Cotton letter to the US executive branch as part of the routine 
sparring among the branches about the scope of executive and 
congressional power. The Senate’s power to advise and consent to 
treaties, however, does not obviously indicate as a matter of text 
or history any congressional authority to communicate with for-
eign powers negotiating with the US executive branch. 
Deploying the arithmetic approach, Congress and the subset 
of senators who sent the Cotton letter appear to have little con-
stitutional power to support their actions and in fact invoked 
none. Subtracting the president’s substantial foreign relations 
and treaty-negotiating powers from the baseline of minimal con-
gressional authority results in a loss for Congress. This may be a 
common result for the instances of nonexecutive foreign relations 
described as “outbound” in Part I. The implied power of the pres-
ident to engage in direct communications with foreign govern-
ments will be present in all such circumstances, and neither 
Congress nor the courts have a clear constitutional power to 
transmit messages to foreign governments unless potentially act-
ing at the direction of the executive (which would be Category 1, 
not Category 3) or, in the case of the courts, engaging in routine 
communications with foreign sovereigns who are parties in cases 
before the courts. 
Although finding constitutional footing for outbound non-
executive foreign relations may often be difficult,254 instances 
 
advice and consent.” Id. See also Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 281 (cited in note 142) 
(describing the incident with an emphasis on how a senator used procedural mechanisms 
to frustrate Washington). 
 253 See Treaties and Other International Agreements at 3 (cited in note 222) (“Although 
Senators sometimes play a part in the initiation or development of a treaty, the Senate 
role now is primarily to pass judgment on whether completed treaties should be ratified 
by the United States.”). 
 254 To be sure, congresspersons have other avenues that do not involve direct commu-
nications to foreign governments to express their views on foreign policy issues. They can, 
for example, make statements on the House or Senate floor, issue press releases, give 
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involving inbound nonexecutive foreign relations—receipt by 
Congress or the courts of direct communications from foreign gov-
ernments—find firmer constitutional footing, as illustrated by the 
next two examples. 
The Netanyahu address to Congress presents a more complex 
question for the Category 3 analysis. As explained in Part II, the 
Netanyahu example is mixed inbound/outbound nonexecutive for-
eign relations: the invitation from Speaker Boehner to Netanyahu 
was an outbound communication conveying a message—an invi-
tation—to Netanyahu, but Netanyahu’s speech itself was inbound 
nonexecutive foreign relations, delivery of a message from a for-
eign government to Congress. The characteristics of inbound non-
executive foreign relations, however, dominate this case. The out-
bound communication was incidental to the inbound 
communication and did not purport to convey substantive policy 
messages, though of course the sending of the invitation at all did 
communicate a message of willingness to engage with Netanyahu 
at a time when the executive branch was not willing to do so. 
The same process for analysis applies. First, what power or 
powers of the executive branch are implicated by the Netanyahu 
address? Again here, the president’s power to receive ambassa-
dors is at issue and potentially infringed.255 Congress literally re-
ceived, over the executive’s objection, an “Ambassador[ ] [or] other 
public Minister[ ].”256 
Unlike in the Cotton letter case where Congress sent an out-
bound message, Congress has an implied constitutional power on 
 
speeches, and speak to the press. These avenues implicate other constitutional protec-
tions, including the Speech or Debate Clause and the First Amendment. US Const Art I, 
§ 6, cl 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [senators and representatives] shall 
not be questioned in any other Place.”); US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”). Given the increasing sophistication 
of foreign governments about the US government and competing power centers within it, 
foreign governments are likely to be aware of statements relevant to their interests, even 
if such statements are not communicated to them directly. See notes 159–60 and accom-
panying text. See also Spiro, GOP Iran Letter Might Be Unconstitutional (cited in note 
127) (“[T]he above-the-fold attention given to the Cotton letter shows that there is some-
thing out of the ordinary going on here. If he had said the same things on CNN no one 
would have paid any attention . . . . Not so as addressed to the Iranian leadership.”). 
 255 A clearer case of infringement would occur if Congress were to receive as a foreign 
head of state a representative of an entity, such as Taiwan, that the United States (via the 
executive branch) has declined to recognize. See Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
U.S. Relations with Taiwan (US Department of State, Sept 13, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4MZV-3JYY (describing the history and current nature of the US-Taiwan 
relationship). 
 256 US Const Art II, § 3. 
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its side of the ledger in hearing from Netanyahu. In addressing 
why he invited Netanyahu, Boehner explained: 
[W]hen it comes to the threat of Iran having a nuclear 
weapon—these are important messages that the Congress 
needs to hear and the American people need to hear. And I 
believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu is the perfect person 
to deliver the message of how serious this threat is.257 
Boehner’s view of congressional power finds support in 
Supreme Court cases that have recognized an implied power of 
Congress to obtain information in support of its legislative func-
tion.258 As the Court noted in a 1927 case, “the power of inquiry 
. . . is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
function.”259 The Court explained: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the 
absence of information respecting the conditions which the 
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the 
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite 
 
 257 Rep. John Boehner Sounds Off on Fight over Homeland Security Funding (cited in 
note 105). 
 258 For academic agreement on this issue, see Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive 
Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 Admin L Rev 109, 111 
(1996) (citation omitted): 
Congress has broad investigatory powers to fulfill its responsibilities under the 
Constitution. . . . A key element of Congress’ ability to carry out this mandate 
depends on how much information is made available to it as it deliberates and 
then legislates. Absent access to accurate, relevant information, it would proba-
bly be impossible to legislate either effectively or wisely. 
See also J.W. Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative 
Process, 18 U Chi L Rev 440, 441 (1951) (explaining the view of a sitting senator that “[t]he 
power to investigate is . . . the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative 
function” because it “provides the legislature with eyes and ears and a thinking mecha-
nism,” as well as “an orderly means of being in touch with and absorbing the knowledge, 
experience and statistical data necessary for legislation in a complex democratic society”); 
Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The 
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo 
Wash L Rev 627, 675 (1989) (noting that “no express provision of the Constitution . . . 
specifically authorizes the Congress to conduct investigations and take testimony for the 
purpose of performing its legitimate functions,” but “numerous decisions of the Supreme 
Court have firmly established that the investigatory power of Congress is so essential to 
the legislative function as to be implied from the general vesting of legislative power in 
Congress”); Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 382–83 (cited in note 10) (discussing “Congress’s 
implied power of investigation”). 
 259 McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 174 (1927). See also Eastland v United States 
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 US 491, 504 (1975) (“This Court has often noted that the power to 
investigate is inherent in the power to make laws.”). 
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information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must 
be had to others who do possess it.260 
The Court has described Congress’s power of investigation or in-
quiry as “broad”261 and explained that “[t]he scope of the power of 
inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential 
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”262 But 
the Court has explained that “the power is not [ ] without limita-
tions” and must be linked to some legitimate action of Congress, 
such as legislation or appropriations.263 The Court has also de-
clined to recognize a congressional power to inform the public, as 
opposed to informing itself.264 Thus, Boehner’s claim of constitu-
tional authority for the Netanyahu invitation must rest on the 
first part of his explanation—the need for Congress to hear from 
Netanyahu—rather than the second part, highlighting the need 
for the US public to hear from him. 
The implied legislative power of inquiry or investigation pro-
vides a counterweight to the executive’s constitutional power to 
 
 260 McGrain, 273 US at 175. 
 261 Watkins v United States, 354 US 178, 187 (1957). See also id (noting that “[t]he 
power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. . . . 
It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as pro-
posed or possibly needed statutes,” “surveys of defects in our social, economic or political 
system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them,” and “probes into de-
partments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste”). 
 262 Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109, 111 (1959). 
 263 Id at 111. See also id at 111–12 (“Since Congress may only investigate into those 
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters 
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government.”); 
Watkins, 354 US at 187: 
[B]road as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general au-
thority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms 
of the functions of the Congress. . . . Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or 
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of 
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in further-
ance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the 
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated 
are indefensible. 
 264 See Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111, 132–33 (1979) (explaining that although 
prior cases “hold[ ] that congressional efforts to inform itself through committee hearings 
are part of the legislative function,” Congress’s perceived “duty of Members to tell the 
public about their activities . . . is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations 
that make up the legislative process”); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Investigations 
of Federal Judges, 90 Iowa L Rev 1, 33 (2004) (arguing that although “Congress frequently 
asserts that it possesses general authority to investigate for the purpose of informing the 
American public,” the Supreme Court has not “endorsed” such claims and instead “has 
suggested that the purpose of informing the American public is not within the core legis-
lative mandate of Congress”). 
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receive ambassadors in circumstances of inbound nonexecutive 
foreign relations. When Congress requests or receives a commu-
nication from a foreign government official that appropriately 
falls within the ambit of its power of inquiry—that is, the commu-
nication relates to actual or potential legislation or is ancillary to 
another congressional power—Congress begins the arithmetic 
analysis with a positive score. 
Congress could arguably invoke the power of inquiry as to the 
Netanyahu speech.265 In recent years, Congress has considered 
and adopted legislation sanctioning Iran for its nuclear pro-
gram.266 Moreover, at the time of Netanyahu’s address, the form 
of the Iran deal was unclear. Congress might have therefore ar-
gued that hearing from Netanyahu was incident to its power to 
approve international agreements. This argument, however, is 
hampered by the fact that the invitation came from the speaker 
of the House, not from the Senate, which has primary responsi-
bility for approving treaties. Nonetheless, it might be incidental 
to the legislative power to approve congressional-executive agree-
ments. In other words, the legitimacy of Congress’s claim to en-
gage in inbound nonexecutive foreign relations depends on 
whether the foreign government’s communications can reasona-
bly be argued to relate to a legitimate function of Congress, such 
as legislation, appropriations, or advising and consenting to 
treaties.267 
Both Youngstown and converse Youngstown provide guid-
ance on what to consider in resolving interbranch power disputes, 
but neither determines which branch prevails once competing 
powers are identified. A constitutional adjudicator’s determina-
tion about which branch prevails in Category 3 will be fact spe-
cific, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, which 
 
 265 The congressional power of inquiry or investigation may also be sufficient to justify 
congressional travel abroad and meetings with foreign government officials as part of fact-
finding missions over the executive’s objection. See, for example, text accompanying notes 
115–17 (discussing then-Speaker Pelosi’s travel to Syria and criticism from President 
Bush). The determination of the constitutionality of such an action will depend on the 
factors discussed below. See notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
 266 See Iran Sanctions (US Department of the Treasury, Sept 25, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PU38-CEN3 (collecting statutes regarding Iran sanctions). 
 267 See Magliocca, Netanyahu’s Address to a Joint Session Is Not Unconstitutional 
(cited in note 110) (proposing that the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the 
Netanyahu address “would be whether Congress is considering legislation related to the 
speech,” and that because it was considering a new Iran sanctions bill, “if Congress wants 
to hear from Netanyahu or anybody else with something useful to say about that, I think 
that they can”). 
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powers are invoked, and the strength of each branch’s arguments 
for the existence and scope of its claimed powers. A determination 
about which branch prevails in Category 3 will also likely vary 
depending on an interpreter’s views of the relative salience of dif-
ferent kinds of arguments the branches might make. For exam-
ple, an interpreter may rely on the extent of interference one 
branch poses to the other branch’s power,268 the historical practice 
to support each branch’s claims,269 or the intent of the branches, 
especially whether they intended to interfere with the other 
branch’s exercise of its competing power.270 Reasonable minds 
may disagree about the relative importance of these factors or 
may add others, and reasonable minds will certainly disagree 
about the application of these factors to specific facts.271 
The Netanyahu address to Congress over the president’s ob-
jection is a close question. Some factors cast serious doubt on 
Congress’s position. In particular, the reception of a foreign 
governmental leader over the executive’s objection was 
unprecedented. Congress therefore has no support in historical 
practice, and the long-standing practice of foreign leaders ad-
dressing Congress only in coordination with the executive branch 
instead supports the president’s position. Moreover, the 
Netanyahu invitation was widely understood as an attempt to in-
terfere with the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations, suggesting 
that Congress did intend to interfere with the president’s power 
to communicate with foreign governments and to negotiate agree-
ments. On the other hand, the degree of interference with the 
president’s communication and negotiation powers appears, at 
least in retrospect, to have been minimal. The Iran deal was con-
cluded, and it was done in a form that did not require Senate or 
congressional approval. As the debates among legal commenta-
tors about the constitutionality of the invitation reveal,272 reason-
able minds can reach different results on this case, but deploying 
the converse Youngstown framework would clarify the terms of 
 
 268 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 691 (1988) (assessing the constitutionality of a 
congressionally imposed “good cause” restriction on removal of an executive officer based 
on whether the restriction “unduly trammels on executive authority”). 
 269 See notes 46–54 and accompanying text. 
 270 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2095 (citing as one reason that a statute infringed 
the president’s exclusive recognition power “the undoubted fact that the purpose of the 
statute was to infringe on the recognition power”). 
 271 See Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework (cited in note 188) (arguing that a 
“legal framework” has “staying power” when it is sufficiently “flexible to appeal to judges 
with competing views, who can all articulate their positions within the framework”). 
 272 See notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
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debate by directing consideration of the powers of both branches 
and providing a mechanism for weighing their interaction. 
A final example of Category 3 analysis rests on a hypothet-
ical. Suppose that upon receiving the Supreme Court clerk’s letter 
stating that filing of diplomatic notes did not comply with the 
Court’s rules, the Department of Justice had attempted to con-
tinue filing them instead of taking its actual approach of declining 
to file diplomatic notes with the Supreme Court or the lower fed-
eral courts. The branches would have clearly been in opposition, 
with the Supreme Court asserting its right to control who can file 
and how they can file with the Court, and the executive asserting 
that regardless of the Court’s stated rules, the executive had the 
right to present foreign governments’ views to the Court. 
In this hypothetical Category 3 case, the executive’s asserted 
power would again have been the implied power to conduct for-
eign relations and to handle communications to and from foreign 
governments. But the Court would have had a strong claim to 
power on its side as well—namely, the implied or inherent power 
of courts to control their own processes. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the “inherent power of every court of justice to control 
its own process.”273 In particular, the Court has explained that 
“[g]uided by considerations of justice, and in the exercise of super-
visory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate proce-
dural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the 
Congress.”274 The courts’ inherent authority includes the power to 
appoint persons, such as amici and special masters, to assist the 
court in carrying out its functions, as well as to allow participa-
tion by those who can assist the court.275 Rules governing how in-
terested parties may (and may not) communicate their views to 
 
 273 Krippendorf v Hyde, 110 US 276, 282 (1884). 
 274 United States v Hasting, 461 US 499, 505 (1983) (citation omitted). See also 
Carlisle v United States, 517 US 416, 425–26 (1996) (affirming the authority of federal 
courts to formulate procedural rules). 
 275 See In re Peterson, 253 US 300, 312–13 (1920) (explaining that “[c]ourts have (at 
least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves 
with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,” including the 
“authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance 
of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause”) (citation omitted); 
John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative 
Alternatives, 2 Wash U J L & Pol 109, 142 (2000) (noting that the “judicial power to seek 
expert assistance” includes both inviting amicus briefs and “appoint[ing] nonwitness ex-
perts in appropriate cases”); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship 
to Advocacy, 72 Yale L J 694, 699 (1963) (discussing evolution of amicus curiae participa-
tion as part of courts’ inherent powers). 
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the court fall within the category of procedural rules that are part 
of the courts’ inherent constitutional power. 
Having identified competing constitutional powers, which 
branch would or should prevail in this hypothetical scenario? 
Considering again factors such as the degree of interference into 
each branch’s powers, intent to interfere with the other branch’s 
powers, and historical practice, there is a strong case that the 
Court should prevail. The shift from the executive branch filing 
diplomatic notes to foreign governments filing their own amicus 
briefs directly poses a minimal interference with the executive’s 
power to communicate with foreign governments. Prior to the 
shift, the executive was essentially fulfilling a ministerial, pass-
through role, simply transmitting the views of foreign govern-
ments to the Court. Sometimes those views were even contrary to 
the executive’s own position, as in Zenith Radio itself, the case 
that prompted the Court to protest the filing of diplomatic 
notes.276 If the executive wishes to contradict or simply opine on 
the views of a foreign government filed before the Court, it can 
file an amicus brief, and per the Court’s rules, the executive has 
an automatic right to file (provided it complies with the filing 
deadlines) and need not seek leave of the Court.277 
By the time of the shift from diplomatic notes in 1978, long-
standing historical practice also supported the filing of amicus 
briefs by foreign governments.278 Foreign governments’ embassies 
filed briefs as early as 1919,279 and foreign governments began fil-
ing briefs in the name of their governments, rather than their em-
bassies, in 1952280—all without apparent objection by the execu-
tive branch. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that by highlighting the non-
compliance of the diplomatic-note practice with its rules the 
Court intended to interfere with the executive’s power to com-
municate with foreign governments. To the contrary, the Court 
 
 276 See notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 277 See US S Ct Rule 37.4. 
 278 For additional details on the history of foreign sovereign amicus briefs, see 
Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 297–302 (cited in note 56). 
 279 See generally Brief of Counsel for British Embassy as Amici Curiae, Strathearn 
Steamship Co v Dillon, Docket No 373 (US filed June 2, 1919). 
 280 See, for example, Lauritzen v Larsen, 345 US 571, 572 (1953) (noting an amicus 
brief filed by Denmark). See also generally Brief of the Royal Danish Government, as Ami-
cus Curiae, Lauritzen v Larsen, Docket No 226 (US filed Nov 26, 1952) (available on 
Westlaw at 1952 WL 82186). 
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would have been well aware that foreign governments had com-
municated their views to the Court directly through amicus briefs 
for nearly six decades without objection by the executive. Even if 
the executive could have made a claim of interference with exec-
utive authority, it had, in essence, already acquiesced to a direct 
channel of communication between foreign governments and the 
Supreme Court in the decades preceding the Court’s letter.281 
Additionally, the Court’s move to have foreign governments’ 
views communicated solely by amicus briefs worked a regulariza-
tion of its processes, ensuring that both the United States and 
foreign governments were treated like all other parties wishing 
to communicate with the Court. The fact of regularization, rather 
than exceptionalism, supports the argument that the Court did 
not intend to interfere with the executive; it was simply policing 
compliance with its normal processes—processes derived from its 
inherent authority. 
For all of these reasons, had the executive continued to at-
tempt to file diplomatic notes after receiving the Court’s letter, 
that hypothetical may have been a converse Youngstown equiva-
lent of Zivotofsky—a Category 3 case in which the presumed los-
ing branch nonetheless prevails. 
CONCLUSION 
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations has already 
sparked several recent incidents of interbranch friction. And tech-
nology, foreign governments’ increasing sophistication about the 
US government, hyperfractionalization in US politics, and the 
“Trump effect” may make nonexecutive foreign relations more fre-
quent and more contentious going forward. 
Moreover, the converse Youngstown framework need not be 
limited in application to the conduct of foreign relations questions 
that this Article addresses. Converse Youngstown can be applied 
to other interbranch separation-of-powers disputes. For example, 
the converse Youngstown framework could be used to analyze a 
court’s attempt to solicit the views of particular executive branch 
departments about a pending case. The Seventh Circuit made 
 
 281 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 435 (cited in note 48) (discussing 
acquiescence as waiver as “akin to the adverse possession doctrine in property law: if one 
branch of government has been engaging in a practice for a long time without any re-
sistance, it (and potentially also third parties) may have formed reasonable expectation 
interests surrounding the practice”). See also id at 453–54 (arguing that executive silence 
or acquiescence is more meaningful than congressional silence). 
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such a request in 2014 in an antitrust case, when, in response to 
the filing of an amicus brief for the United States signed by the 
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, the court 
issued an order “invit[ing]” the Departments of Commerce and 
State to file amicus briefs on the foreign relations impacts of the 
case.282 The executive branch declined the court’s “invitation.”283 
The converse Youngstown framework could also be used to assess 
the constitutionality of congressional actions, such as resolutions 
that purport to place limits on the president’s war powers.284 
The converse Youngstown framework avoids some of the 
weaknesses of the traditional Youngstown analysis, but more im-
portantly, it fills out the picture for separation-of-powers dis-
putes. The Youngstown and converse Youngstown frameworks to-
gether ensure that constitutional interpreters in any branch of 
government and scholars outside the government can systemati-
cally evaluate competing constitutional claims to power. 
 
 282 Order of May 1, 2014, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action 
No 14-8003 (7th Cir filed May 1, 2014). See also generally Brief for the United States and 
the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Panel Rehearing or Rehear-
ing En Banc, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action No 14-8003 (7th 
Cir filed Apr 24, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 1878995). 
 283 Letter from Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr to Gino J. Agnello, Clerk of 
Court, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action No 14-8003 (7th Cir 
filed May 19, 2014). 
 284 See, for example, War Powers Resolution, Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973), 
codified at 50 USC §§ 1541–48. 
